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REALIZING RELIABILITY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE FROM THE GROUND UP
JESSICA D. GABEL*
This Article emphasizes that forensic flaws persist and that
deficiencies in forensic science have harrowing implications for criminal
justice. In the wake of numerous calls for forensic reform, I propose that
we use existing models and frameworks already in place to improve the
quality and cost of the U.S. forensic science program, rather than creating
an entirely new and unaffordable system. At bottom, this Article calls for
collaboration between crime labs, universities and research centers, and
the criminal justice system with the goal of making forensic science more
reliable.
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INTRODUCTION
Forensic science is a fractured and burdened discipline. Five years
ago, in 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a
revealing report announcing that forensic science is broken.1 Depending on
the audience, reactions to the NAS Report ran the gamut, from calling it
predictable to groundbreaking to misleading.2 In many respects, although it
could hardly be characterized as new information, the NAS Report laid
forensic science’s shortcomings to bare and brought to the surface the
weaknesses that have plagued forensic science for decades.3 Moreover, the
NAS Report underscored a harsh truth: faulty forensic science has
contributed to convicting innocent people—and will continue to do so if the
status quo persists.4
1 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 14 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
2
See Matt Clarke, Crime Labs in Crisis: Shoddy Forensics Used to Secure Convictions,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS, http://goo.gl/UXrlgI (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (explaining that crime
lab officials “reacted with predictable outrage” to the NAS report); Gregory S. Klees,
SWGGUN Initial Response to the NAS Report, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GRP. FOR FIREARMS &
TOOLMARKS, http://goo.gl/PzoH76 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (“The [Scientific Working
Group for Firearms and Toolmarks] has been aware of the scientific and systemic issues
identified in this report . . . .”).
3
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (pointing to the “variability in capacity, oversight,
staffing, certification, and accreditation across federal and state jurisdictions” and the
“backlogs in state and local crime laboratories” as two symptoms of the broken state of
forensic science).
4
JON B. GOULD ET AL., PREDICTING ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 76 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/hBSsyV; see
also NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
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American courts have improperly legitimized various forensic
disciplines without subjecting them to the kind of scrutiny that would be
required of novel scientific or technical evidence today. Courts accept the
untested view that “science,” such as fingerprinting and hair analysis, is (1)
generally accepted, (2) science, and (3) reliable. Such unsupported
conclusions have lacked adequate scrutiny, whether from a scientific or a
legal perspective. Take forensic fingerprint analysis. The common—yet
unrealistically romantic—starting point is that there are no two fingerprints
exactly alike in the world. That assumption produces the further
assumption that fingerprint analysis must be correspondingly reliable. This
logic is erroneous.
For example, forensic science and its resulting expert testimony sealed
the fate of Bennie Starks during his trial for a brutal rape in 1986.5 At trial,
the State’s forensic serologist testified that, based on her analysis of a
semen sample taken from the victim’s underpants and a sample obtained
from Starks, she could not exclude Starks as the source.6 The prosecution
also hired dentists Dr. Carl Hagstrom and Dr. Russell Schneider (who selfidentified as experts in forensic odontology) to testify that bite marks on the
victim’s shoulder had been made by Starks.7 The dentists testified that after
comparing the evidence, photos, X-rays, and a model of Starks’s teeth, the
bite marks shared sixty-two similar characteristics with Starks’s teeth.8
After hearing these forensic “experts” testify that scientific evidence tied
the defendant to the crime, the jury convicted Starks of two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault, and
aggravated battery.9 Starks was sentenced to sixty years in prison.10
In 2006, after spending nearly twenty years behind bars, a DNA test
categorically excluded Starks as the source of the semen. 11 Additionally,
two other odontologists’ independent examinations of the bite mark
evidence completely discredited the conclusions and testimonies presented
at trial.12 Their reports pointed out that the examination method used by the
State’s odontologists had since been rejected by its own creators and
concluded that the dentists “misapplied the methodology and used flawed

5

People v. Starks, 975 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 73, 77.
7
Starks v. City of Waukegan, No. 09 C 348, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *2, *5–6
(N.D. Ill. May 21, 2013).
8
Starks, 975 N.E.2d at 73; see also Starks, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *2, *5.
9
Starks, 975 N.E.2d at 72–73.
10
Id. at 72.
11
Id. at 77.
12
Id.
6
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preservation and photography techniques.”13 The appeals court ordered
Starks released on bond pending a new trial.14 His convictions were
vacated and the last charges dismissed in January 2013.15 Although Starks
is free today, the lack of lab oversight and forensic standards leaves forensic
science distrusted and vulnerable to manipulation. During the twenty years
Starks spent behind bars, advancements in forensic science technology
progressed exponentially, yet the system continues to suffer from fatal
flaws and a low threshold of reliability.
Indeed, five years after the NAS Report, the so-called “Path Forward”
seems murky, and various political logjams have barricaded the road to
reliability. I posit that reliability—the bedrock of forensic science—
remains a fleeting notion, because efforts at reform have lacked
coordination and implementation. The only way to adequately address the
flaws brought to light through the NAS Report is to align the various
stakeholders and make a concerted effort from all facets of forensic science,
rather than waiting for guidance through a frustrated and exhausted
legislative and judicial process.
Although impossible to quantify, the number of wrongfully convicted
individuals is at least in the hundreds.16 Unreliable science presents itself in
a virtual smorgasbord of ways, from the routine (contamination) to the
egregious (forensic misconduct) and everything in between (misrepresented
or exaggerated results, misinterpretation of results, lack of research for
basic assumptions, unqualified analysts, inconsistent lab practices).
Regardless of the root causes of the forensic flaws, the NAS Report clearly
issued a “call to arms” to reform forensic science from the top down by
proposing the creation of a centralized National Institute of Forensic
Science (NIFS).17 Little has been done, however, to achieve reform.
Indeed, legislation has crawled to a standstill (i.e., dead in the water) several

13

Id.
Id. at 74.
15
See Starks v. City of Waukegan, No. 09 C 348, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *11
(N.D. Ill. May 21, 2013). Starks brought a civil suit against the two dentists and the forensic
serologist (among others) for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by
intentionally misapplying the methodologies that led to their conclusions, knowingly giving
false testimony to the jurors, and conspiring to secure Starks’s conviction. See id. at *2–3, *6.
16
See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009).
17
See The NAS Report Update, 7 EVIDENCE TECH. MAG. 12, 13 (March–April 2009) (“The
number-one recommendation offered in the NAS report call[ed] for the formation of an
independent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic Science . . . .” (citation omitted)).
14
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times in Congress, and certain constituencies have brought stiff resistance
to reforms.18
With the exception of DNA, no single forensic technique yet has the
ability to definitively link an evidence sample to its source.19 Ability is
very different from invariable actuality, however; even DNA evidence has
its limitations and stress points.20 Deficiencies in forensic science have
harrowing implications, and the number of exonerations in recent years has
underscored the very real threat that innocent people can be convicted. The
reality of wrongful convictions has risen to the forefront of public
awareness through the work of the Innocence Project and other
organizations.21 Of course, there are numerous factors that relate to
wrongful convictions outside of faulty forensic evidence—witness
misidentification, false confessions, jailhouse snitches22—but in some ways,
the public conception of erroneous convictions, and that DNA will cure
them all, represents a somewhat myopic view.
The Innocence Project predominantly accepts cases where biological
evidence is available for DNA testing.23 That only applies to a small subset
of cases with potential claims of actual innocence. For each case where
DNA is able to definitively exonerate an individual, there are many more

18
See Bernadette Mary Donovan & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward—or Has It Been a Path Misplaced?, 36
CHAMPION 22, 23–24, 27 (2012) (outlining issues with the Criminal Justice and Forensic
Science Reform Act—which proposes federal oversight in the form of an agency located
within DOJ, in stark contrast to the NAS Report’s emphasis on independence from law
enforcement—and describing opposition from prosecutors and forensic scientists to defense
counsel’s use of the NAS Report).
19
In Law and Order terms, accuracy and precision are “two separate yet equally
important” concepts. “Accuracy” evaluates whether the correct result can be reached and
what the strength of that result is; “precision” measures the repeatability or reproducibility of
the same result. See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic
Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 23 (2010); Quality
Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/NE3wL4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
20
William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still Controversial in Some
Cases, 36 Champion 12, 12 (2012) (“[W]hen labs try to ‘type’ samples that contain too little
DNA, or DNA that is too degraded, the results of the DNA test can be unreliable.”).
21
Wrongful convictions are also not a creature of the twentieth century. In Perry’s Case,
14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (1660), a servant named Perry went to search for his master, Harrison,
after Harrison went missing. Perry disappeared, but was found with some of Harrison’s bloody
items. Id. at 1313–14. Harrison’s body was never found, and Perry gave inconsistent stories.
Id. at 1314–16. Perry was hanged. Id. at 1319. Harrison returned some time later with a story
of being robbed, taken by force to Turkey, and forced into slavery. Id. at 1313.
22
See GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at iii, xii.
23
See About the Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/iLWcRE (last
visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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equally innocent people in cases where DNA evidence is lacking.24 Relying
on the postconviction process to correct the problem simply puts a BandAid on a gaping wound. We can do better. DNA may provide the “get out
of jail free” card in certain cases, but its absence in others nearly ensures
that both the convictions and any bad forensic practices involved will
persist.
To prevent wrongful convictions (as opposed to just responding to
them), the NAS Report concluded that problems with forensic evidence
could “only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current
structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.”25
To be clear, the NAS Report was not the first conscious conclusion that
forensic science needs work.26 Moreover, the Report was not the first
suggestion that the mechanisms for change should occur at the federal
level.27 It probably will not be the last.
The spate of legislation the NAS Report has spawned over the past few
years represents a laudable but failed effort to repair a broken system.28
The top-down mentality of restructuring forensics essentially sweeps
everything behind a gigantic curtain in an attempt to control all of the loose
pieces in a one-size-fits-all manner. But a careful evaluation of the bottom
of that curtain reveals the wizard’s feet peeking out: reforms are plagued by
underfunded entities, unrealistic budgets, and permissive language that
strips real reform of any enforcement power. Simply put, if we continue to
suggest a national entity to overhaul forensic science in a grandiose and
unrealistic fashion, then we will continue to tabulate wrongful convictions
based on bad science.
Having formerly argued that we need a federal agency devoted to the
reliable development and distribution of sound forensic science,29 history

24
See Nancy Petro, Federal Grant Will Target Wrongful Conviction Cases with No DNA,
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://goo.gl/VnJ84V (“The vast
majority of criminal cases—some estimate up to 90 percent—do not have DNA evidence to
help settle claims of wrongful conviction.”).
25
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at xx.
26
See id. at xix (noting that the impetus of the report was congressional recognition “that
significant improvements are needed in forensic science.”).
27
See id. at xx (explaining that the consistent message conveyed to the NAS committee
by guest speakers in various areas of the forensic science industry was that a federal system
is necessary to effectuate reform); see also Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013,
H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. (2013).
28
See Donovan & Ungvarsky, supra note 18, at 23–26 (outlining the shortcomings of
legislation proposed in the wake of the NAS Report).
29
See Jessica D. Gabel & Ashley D. Champion, Response, Regulating the Science of
Forensic Evidence: A Broken System Requires a New Federal Agency, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE
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coupled with reality tells me that legislative gridlock and territorial pissing
contests may make this impossible. Thus, while I still maintain that
centralization is the key, I now advocate for a grassroots effort in creating a
reliable forensic framework from the ground up, rather than the top down.
Cooperation and collaboration across all levels of the criminal justice
commerce stream is, in my view, the only currently accessible method. In
addition, bringing universities—the bastions of scientific research—into the
framework will increase the speed and accuracy, while reducing the costs,
of developing standards. Law enforcement, forensic analysts, research
scientists, and lawyers need to recognize that forensic science does not exist
in a vacuum, and if errors continue to multiply, then we are left with a
system that only slides deeper into disrepair.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I focuses on the science
behind forensics and highlights some of the misconceptions regarding the
validity of some disciplines. Part II discusses previous attempts at forensic
reform in the United States.
Part III discusses the obstacles to
implementing a federal forensic science entity and national standards,
including potential constitutional challenges and the ever-present issue of
locating funding for such an endeavor. Part IV proposes that, rather than
creating an entirely new framework, we should leverage existing
frameworks already in place to improve the quality and cost of the U.S.
forensic science program. Finally, Part V outlines some works-in-progress,
notably the U.K.’s major overhaul, and suggests that we capitalize on
lessons already learned from those who have transformed forensics into a
science.
I. FORENSICS: FAR FROM SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY
“[Forensic science] is justice’s best friend, but it has to not only be used right but done
right.”30

Despite the authority with which television and movie crime dramas
depict forensic science results, the practice sometimes falls short of that
“used and done right” standard. Popular culture, news outlets, and public
perception guide the belief that forensic evidence is reliable and absolute
proof of an individual’s guilt. In fact, forensic evidence has the essential
hallmarks of certainty that juries need and society craves. Most people
agree that it would be a miscarriage of justice to imprison an innocent

ALSO 19, 26–27 (2011) (arguing that a federal agency should be created to regulate forensic
services nationwide).
30
Richard Willing, Errors Prompt States to Watch Over Crime Labs, USA TODAY, Mar.
31, 2006, at 3A (quoting Texas State Senator Juan “Chuy” Hinojosa).
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person.31 Consequently, we want to be sure that we are convicting the right
person. In many cases, forensic evidence closes the confidence gap left
open by these concerns and seals the defendant’s fate.32 It has the power to
move the jury from maybe to guilty, and everyone can sleep better at night
because “science” solidified the conviction.33 The forensic analysts, then,
are the criminal justice system’s rock stars, bringing their objective
scientific skill and authority to an otherwise emotionally charged process.34
Yet, “public crime laboratories are not the sanctuaries of science we
believed them to be.”35 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that
“[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in
criminal trials.”36 It is undeniable, and the “legal community now
concedes, with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces
erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.”37
A. “SCIENCE” SHORT OF THE NTH DEGREE

In tracking the 311 cases of postconviction exoneration brought about
by DNA testing, the Innocence Project estimates that the average sentence
served in those cases is about thirteen years, with eighteen people sentenced
to death before DNA was able to prove their innocence.38 Moreover, of
those 311 cases, 141 of the original convictions involved “unvalidated or
improper forensic science.”39 Given the now-universal nature of DNA

31

But see In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This court has
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a
full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”).
32
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (“[I]n some cases . . . testimony based on faulty
forensic science analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people.”).
33
This is not to say that forensic science does not have its place in the criminal justice
system. Rather, it needs to be presented in context and in light of its weaknesses.
34
For example, Dr. Henry Lee is an accomplished forensic analyst who has worked on
high-profile cases, including the JonBenét Ramsey case, the O.J. Simpson case, and the
Casey Anthony case. See Bianca Prieto & Walter Pacheco, Star Criminalist Joins Defense
Team, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 2008, at B1; Famous Cases, DRHENRYLEE.COM,
http://goo.gl/Zob0TH (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
35
Craig M. Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science: How Appropriate Funding and
Government Oversight Can Further Strengthen the Forensic Science Community, 17 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 441, 442 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
36
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
37
Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 491 (2006).
38
See Know the Cases: DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://goo.gl/NCkK94 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
39
See Know the Cases: Search the Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/viN1Z5
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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testing, “it is possible to forget that, for decades, law enforcement had to
rely on much less accurate forensic methods.”40
Although today’s criminal cases often revolve around whether there is
DNA—even for low-level property crimes—forensic science traditionally
encompasses many different disciplines. Those disciplines include “general
toxicology, firearms/toolmarks, questioned documents, trace evidence,
controlled substances, biological/serological screening, fire debris/arson
analysis, impression evidence (e.g., fingerprints, shoe/tire prints), blood
pattern analysis, crime scene investigation, medicolegal death investigation,
and digital evidence.”41 In many forensic disciplines, “the human examiner
is the main instrument of analysis.”42 The forensic analyst examines “visual
patterns and determines if they are ‘sufficiently similar’ to conclude that
they originate from the same source.”43 The forensic disciplines can thus be
divided into two main categories: lab disciplines and disciplines based on
expert interpretation of observed patterns.44 Examples of the former include
DNA analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis.45 Disciplines based on expert
interpretations aim to determine a common source for patterns observed in,
but not limited to, fingerprints, writing samples, and toolmarks.46
In what may be an oversimplification of the distinction, the lab
disciplines also bring quantitative results that seem to reflect objectivity.
For example, DNA results culminate in the all-important statistical
representation of the likelihood of a random match based on population
genetics47—i.e., the pervasive “1 in n billion” number. The lab-based
forensic disciplines are deemed to be more analytical and thus more reliable
than the more subjective “pattern identification” disciplines, which produce
qualitative results.48 Although consideration of whether the lab disciplines
are deserving of such deference is better saved for another article, the
40

GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUS AND NEEDS OF FORENSIC
SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2006) [hereinafter STATUS AND
NEEDS], available at http://goo.gl/UKJgzi.
42
Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and
Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42, 43 (2013).
43
Id.
44
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6–7.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 40–41. See generally The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations: Hearing
on S. 775 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2011–2012 Leg., 195th Sess. (Pa. 2011)
(statement of David H. Kaye, Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law),
available at http://goo.gl/DXdLrE.
48
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (“In terms of scientific basis, the analytically based
disciplines generally hold a notable edge over disciplines based on expert interpretation.”).
41
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element of subjectivity inherent in the analysis of lab disciplines merits
comment. DNA analysis is subject to human error based on the
interpretation (read: subjective analysis) of results that include, among other
things, mixture samples, Low Copy Number DNA,49 and degraded
evidence.50
Distinctions aside, forensic science disciplines lack significant peerreviewed research of the scientific bases and validity studies that should
support their methods.51 Fingerprint-matching techniques, for instance,
lack “sufficient data on the diagnosticity and reliability” of even the most
basic assumptions.52 For pattern-identification methods generally, research
establishing the limits and measures of their performance is “sorely
needed.”53 Although research in many disciplines would allow for more
consistent, quantitative results, research culture has not found a foothold in
forensic science.54 Without the requisite level of empiricism that grounds
scientific endeavors, forensic science devolves into forensic art.
Despite the public desire for certainty and the legal requirement to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[f]ew forensic science methods
have developed adequate measures of the accuracy of inferences made by
forensic scientists.”55 It seems to be common sense that every forensic
technique should include the applicable level of “uncertainty in the
measurements that are made.”56 Taken in isolation, the lack of scientifically
acceptable standards for such a wide segment of forensic practices that
continually calls itself a “science” seems quixotic.
The disconnect between forensic research and forensic practice
occurred long ago and is the product of a criminal justice system that
misplaces value in that gap. Many of the disciplines evolved solely for the

49

Low Copy Number DNA usually refers to DNA from which it is difficult to obtain a
full profile due to “damaged or degraded DNA, oligospermic or aspermic perpetrators or
from extended interval post coital samples, where sperm have been lost over time due to the
effects of drainage or host cell metabolism.” DNA Analyst Training: Low Copy Number
DNA, NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., http://goo.gl/1ah2Ip (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
50
See generally Thompson et al., supra note 20 (discussing the problems with mixture,
low copy DNA, and degraded samples).
51
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
52
See Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They
Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1079 (2008).
53
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
54
Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences,
58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 778 (2011).
55
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 184.
56
Id.
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purpose of solving crimes,57 and I hazard a guess that the inability to
challenge forensic techniques’ reliability due to the lack of solid research
produces more convictions than acquittals. In the absence of validation
studies, forensic techniques were initially applied to cases; once their
application was established, the ongoing prosecutorial use of forensic
techniques (and a good bit of judicial notice) continued unquestioned, and
courts cemented their longevity.58
With a pile of cases to solve, research, repeatability, and reliability
assessments were—quite understandably—not crime labs’ priority.
Furthermore, implementing research and standards presents costs (in both
workload and real dollars) that crime lab budgets simply cannot absorb.
This steady progression to deem results acceptable, however, permitted
forensic evidence development to continue unimpeded and elevated it to
“sure bet” status in criminal trials. Of course, some forensic evidence is
more reliable than others,59 but that does not excuse a continued culture of
“because I said so” testimony that uses loaded terminology such as
“match,” “positively,” or “to the exclusion of all others” without the proper
considerations of validity and rarity found in other research sciences.
This lack of a research-oriented culture in forensic evidence leads to
errors in the way the evidence is used in prosecutions and presented in
courts. In a recent study of the “predictors” of wrongful convictions, Jon
Gould et al. concluded that forensic errors most often accumulate in
evidence interpretation and the resulting testimony, rather than the “actual
scientific testing.”60 In some ways, these predictors presuppose that
“scientific testing” takes place, as opposed to analysts merely “eyeballing”61
the evidence. Nonetheless, Gould and colleagues do acknowledge that
there is a fundamental lack of foundational research underlying forensic
science disciplines. This contributes to the eventual errors in forensic
testimony, such as exaggerating the “inculpatory nature of the evidence by
57

See Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://goo.gl/gs5CFA (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (“While the
principles underlying fingerprint identification have not attained the status of scientific law,
they nonetheless bear the imprimatur of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert
community, but in the courts as well.”).
59
DNA is often heralded as the gold standard, and the NAS Report cites it as the one
method that “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or
source.” NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
60
See GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at xix.
61
See Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, “Good” Science Gone Bad: How the
Criminal Justice System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001,
1003–13 (2008) (outlining examples of faulty testing methods that result in wrongful convictions).
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providing inaccurate or non-existent statistics; and misstating the certainty
of the results when the forensic technique, such as bite mark, scent, or fiber
analysis, does not allow for it.”62 Indeed, there are no instruments that
measure or quantify a reasonable degree of scientific certainty when the
“scientific certainty” really boils down to the experience of the witness and
not much else.
B. SPLITTING HAIRS: ANATOMY OF A CHEAP FIX

In a 2012 sequence of investigative reports, the Washington Post
exposed a Department of Justice (DOJ) review of hundreds of cases
believed to contain flawed forensics. The DOJ task force spanned nine
years and (regrettably) focused on the work of one particular examiner
performing hair and fiber analyses. DOJ officials began reexamining cases
in the 1990s after receiving reports that careless work by analysts at the FBI
lab produced unreliable forensic results that were later used in trials. The
results of that DOJ review—kept silent from many alleged offenders for
more than a decade—demonstrated that flawed hair and fiber evidence was
used to garner convictions in numerous cases.63
Hair and fiber evidence has long been the subject of scrutiny.64 It
should not come as a surprise that some of the defendants against whom
this evidence was used turned out to be innocent. What is surprising is that
DOJ deliberately withheld the findings from the defendants whose
convictions resulted—at least in part—on that evidence. Instead, DOJ
made the findings available only to the prosecutors in the affected cases.
The Washington Post’s investigation revealed that possibly fewer than half
of the defendants whose hair evidence was called into question never
learned of the task force’s review. Based on this investigation alone, it is
clear that numerous individuals may “remain in prison or on parole for
crimes that might merit exoneration, a retrial or a retesting of evidence
using DNA because FBI hair and fiber experts may have misidentified them
as suspects.”65
In one such case, Donald E. Gates served twenty-eight years for the
rape and murder of a Georgetown University student based on FBI Special
Agent Michael P. Malone’s testimony that Gates’s hair was found on the
62

GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at xix–xx, 16–19.
See Spencer S. Hsu, Defendants Left Unaware of Flaws Found in Cases, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 2012, at A1.
64
See generally Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227 (1996) (discussing studies showing a propensity for false
matches in hair analysis and their role in wrongful convictions).
65
Hsu, supra note 63.
63
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victim’s body.66 DNA testing exonerated Gates in 2009.67 Even before the
DOJ task force reviewed Malone’s work, DOJ’s Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) issued an unsparing report on investigated “allegations of
wrongdoing and improper practices within certain sections of the [FBI]
Laboratory.”68 That particular report—released in 1997—specifically
targeted Malone. Malone’s work was the lynchpin to Gates’s conviction,
but Gates never learned about the OIG’s report regarding Malone or his
faulty work.69 Although eventually exonerated and released, Gates spent
decades in prison for a crime he did not commit.70
Benjamin Herbert Boyle was also convicted based on Malone’s
testimony.71 Boyle’s case was part of the task force’s review, but—like
Gates—he never learned of the investigations into Malone’s case. In fact,
Boyle would never have the opportunity to learn about it. The State of
Texas executed him in 1997.72 A prosecutor’s memo indicated that Boyle
never would have been eligible for the death penalty had the problems in
the FBI lab work been disclosed.73 The task force would later determine
that Malone’s conclusions in Boyle’s case were flawed.74
For years, scholars, attorneys, and scientists have questioned the
validity of microscopic hair comparison. The discipline is beset with
weaknesses; yet, DOJ only reviewed the work of one FBI analyst—
Malone—despite the questions surrounding the integrity of the FBI lab as a
whole.75 Of course, choosing to focus on one bad apple rather than a
holistic repair of the tree is the easier, lower cost option. Moreover, it
66

See id.
See id.
68
MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVESRELATED AND OTHER CASES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1997) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY], available at http://goo.gl/vkqYfY.
69
Hsu, supra note 63.
70
Id.
71
See id.
72
See Killer Is Executed in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at A16. In addition to the
faulty hair evidence, the former pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy, Dr. Ralph
R. Erdmann, was sentenced to ten years of probation in 1992 for seven felony counts
involving falsified autopsies in various Texas counties. See Bobby Cervantes, DNA Testing
Flaws Concern Attorneys, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, Aug. 18, 2012, at A1; Roberto Suro,
Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West Coast, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1992, at A22.
73
Debra Cassens Weiss, Review Found FBI Hair Analysis Flaws in 250 Cases, But DOJ
Didn’t Inform Defendants and Public, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 17, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://goo.gl/O2CqKL.
74
See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 68.
75
See id.
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allowed the task force to blame the misconduct or ineptitude of one and
ignore the systemic failures of an entire discipline.
The shortsightedness of such limited review, however, is palpable
when viewed through the lens of cases that slipped through the cracks.
Santae A. Tribble was convicted of killing a taxi driver named John
McCormick in 1978.76 During the investigation of McCormick’s murder in
Seat Pleasant, Maryland, a police dog uncovered a stocking mask one block
away from the crime scene; the stocking contained thirteen hairs in total.77
Of the thirteen, the FBI concluded through hair analysis that one belonged
to Tribble.78 Over the course of his three-day trial, Tribble took the stand in
his own defense, urging the jury to accept the fact that he had no connection
to McCormick’s death.79 Nevertheless, the jurors gave weight to the one
“matching” hair and found Tribble guilty of murder; the judge sentenced
him to twenty years to life in prison.80
Both in prison and while on parole, Tribble maintained his innocence,
and in January 2012, Tribble’s lawyer succeeded in having the evidence
retested.81 A private lab concluded through DNA testing that the hairs
could not have belonged to Tribble.82 A more thorough analysis at the time
of the crime—even absent DNA testing—would have revealed the same
result: one hair had Caucasian characteristics and Tribble is AfricanAmerican.83 But a shoddy examination left an innocent man in prison for
twenty-five years, plus another three years on top of that for failing to meet
the conditions of his parole.84 And Tribble is, perhaps, “lucky.” His case
had testable DNA, and he found freedom in 2012, eight years after the task
force completed its work.85
76

See Hsu, supra note 63.
See id.; see also Spencer S. Hsu, 2 Jurors Back Exoneration of Man Found Guilty in
Death, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2012, at B1.
78
See Hsu, supra note 63; see also Hsu, supra note 77 (describing a juror’s suspicion
that other jurors wrongly discounted Tribble’s detailed alibi).
79
See Hsu, supra note 63.
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
Spencer S. Hsu, Conviction Vacated in 1978 D.C. Killing, WASH. P OST, May 17,
2012, at B1.
85
See Hsu, supra note 63. By contrast, Cameron Todd Willingham received a death
sentence and was later executed by the State of Texas on what even staunch death penalty
supporters deem faulty arson evidence. Fire Expert Criticizes Investigation that Led to
Execution, CNN JUSTICE (Jan. 7, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://goo.gl/80jCzx; see also Marc Price
Wolf, Habeas Relief from Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for
Prisoners Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
213, 230–31, 246–47 (2009) (analyzing the faulty science on which Willingham was
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In another case that escaped the task force’s review, Kirk L. Odom
was convicted of sexual assault in 1981.86 The star prosecution witness—
an FBI special agent—testified that a hair discovered on the victim’s
nightgown was microscopically similar to Odom’s hair, “meaning the
samples were indistinguishable.”87 To illustrate the credibility of the
evidence, the agent also testified that he had concluded hairs to be
indistinguishable only “eight or 10 times in the past 10 years, while
performing thousands of analyses.”88 Although Odom presented alibi
evidence, the jury convicted him after just a few hours of deliberation.
Odom was paroled in March 2003 and was required to register as a sex
offender.89
That would have been the end of Odom’s story had it not been for his
lawyer’s crusade to right the wrongs attributable to the erroneous hair
comparisons.90 In February 2011, Sandra Levick (who had also represented
Gates and Tribble) filed a motion for DNA testing under the D.C.
Innocence Protection Act.91 In response, the government located stained
bedsheets, a robe, and the microscopically examined hair from the crime
scene.92 “DNA-STR testing on semen from a pillowcase and robe, as well
as mitochondrial testing of the hair, all excluded Odom” and instead
implicated a convicted sex offender.93 Odom was exonerated on July 13,
2012.94
In response to the Gates–Tribble–Odom trifecta, DOJ and the FBI
announced a joint effort to review convictions involving FBI (and only FBI)
analyses of hair evidence.95 For its part, the FBI appears to be in denial. In
a July 2012 statement, the FBI explained:
The FBI Laboratory still conducts microscopic hair comparisons. There is no reason
to believe the FBI Laboratory employed “flawed” forensic techniques.

convicted, and subsequently executed); David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an
Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42.
86
See Hsu, supra note 63.
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Id.
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Id.
89 See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/D1VBNT (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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See Hsu, supra note 63; see also Spencer S. Hsu, After DNA Retesting, Kirk Odom
Exonerated, WASH. POST, July 14, 2012, at B6.
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See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, supra note 89; Know the Cases: Santae Tribble,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/FOHLht (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, supra note 89.
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The validity of the science of microscopic hair comparison is not at issue; however,
based on recent cases, the FBI and Department of Justice are committed to
undertaking a review of historical cases that occurred prior to the regular use of
mitochondrial DNA testing to ensure that FBI testimony at trial properly reflects the
bounds of the underlying science.96

The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Ronald C. Machen,
Jr., has stated that his office would conduct “a sweeping review” of past
cases “where hair analysis was used in part to secure convictions.”97 In
addition to being too little, too late for some, this effort again seems to
deliberately ignore the fact that flawed hair analysis is a widespread
problem.98 To believe such errors occur in isolation—confined to just one
lab or just one forensic discipline such as hair analysis—is nonsensical
when the entire forensic discipline produces wrongful convictions because
of analytical and structural defects. In many cases, we continue to allow the
criminal justice system to be held hostage by bad science, and those caught
in the cross hairs have little recourse from a system designed to reinforce
finality over truth.99
C. READING THE FINE PRINT

Questionable results may come from weak methodology,
misapplication of methods to a specific case, second-rate analysts, or
outright fraud. While it may be easy to conceive of how forensic errors can
exist in disciplines such as hair analysis, we have more difficulty
understanding errors in established forensic techniques, such as latent print
identification, commonly known as fingerprints. The bedrock of fingerprint
analysis is the familiar refrain that no two fingerprints are alike. Indeed,
fingerprints have general ridge patterns that make it possible to
96
Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Clarifies Reporting on Microscopic
Hair Comparisons Conducted by the Laboratory (July 13, 2012), available at
http://goo.gl/bhoaDC.
97
See Paul Wagner, DNA Shows Flawed Science Used at Trial, myFOXdc.com (Mar. 16,
2012, 12:49 PM), http://goo.gl/L3nMsD; see also Hsu, supra note 63 (noting that “[Machen’s]
office would try to review all convictions that used hair analysis” (emphasis added)).
98
See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A Cautionary Tale, 46
CRIM. L. BULL. 531 (2010) (examining the judicial history and the lack of empirical basis in
the techniques of microscopic hair analysis and its role in wrongful convictions).
99
See Gabel & Wilkinson, supra note 61. In “Good” Science Gone Bad, Margaret
Wilkinson and I called upon legislatures to consider avenues for redressing wrongful
convictions won through junk science. Notably, Texas responded to that challenge in June
2013 and enacted a law that ensures access to the courts for habeas corpus writs based on
science that is later deemed to be unreliable (or new science that did not exist at the time of
conviction). TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West Supp. 2013). This effort
should be applauded, though time will tell if other states follow suit and whether individuals
are able to successfully use this mechanism.
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systematically classify and compare them, and the average fingerprint
contains between 50 and 150 points of comparison (termed “friction ridge
analysis”).100
But fingerprint analysis does not involve a comparison of 150 or even
50 points of identification. Rather, most jurisdictions in the United States
do not require a minimum number of points between samples to sufficiently
call the comparison a “match.”101 Even among fingerprint analysts, the
number of points of similarity required for identification varies, ranging
from as few as eight points to as many as twelve or more.102 So, while it
may be that on the whole no two fingerprints are alike, there is little to
support that six, ten, or even twelve points are a sufficiently discriminating
means of identifying a suspect. Moreover, such evidence is never presented
with an indication of how accurate it might be (i.e., a quantifiable number
that presents the analyst’s confidence in the conclusion). It seems logical
that the likelihood that a given print belongs to a suspect increases when
there are more points of commonality. Yet, the fingerprint community has
never embraced this component because the requisite data (i.e., probability
studies) does not exist.103
Such a theoretical disconnect became a blatant reality in the case of
Brandon Mayfield. On March 11, 2004, a terrorist attack on commuter
trains in Madrid, Spain, killed approximately 200 people and injured over
1,400 more.104 Needing assistance, the Spanish National Police enlisted the
help of the world-renowned FBI crime lab and its fingerprint specialists.
Just eight days later, on March 19, the FBI identified Mayfield as the source
of one of the fingerprints on a bag containing detonators connected with the

100
See DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 1–9 (1999) (outlining the
evolution of friction ridge analysis).
101
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 17 (Mass. 2005) (“[M]ost
agencies in the United States no longer mandate any specific number [of matches.] Rather,
the examiner uses his expertise, experience, and training to make a final determination.”
(citation omitted)).
102
See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science”
Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 638 (2002) (noting that the number of matching
characteristics sufficient for identification is “entirely subjective”).
103
See, e.g., Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (2003) (finding that “[n]o one can
say, with any certainty, whether fingerprint identification evidence is always truly accurate”
because very little independent data exists); see also id. at 32 (recognizing that most
“testing” of forensic evidence occurs in adversarial proceedings and is “an insufficient
substitute for rigorous empirical study and scientific testing” (emphasis added)).
104
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2006), available at http://goo.gl/xzik2o.
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attacks.105 A second examiner verified the “match,” and a unit chief
reviewed the conclusion and concurred in the results.106 The FBI then
learned on April 13 that the Spanish National Police performed an
independent examination of the print comparison but could not positively
identify Mayfield as the source.107 After meeting with FBI representatives,
the Spanish National Police agreed it would reexamine Mayfield’s
fingerprints.108
The FBI ultimately arrested Mayfield on May 6.109 Mayfield was still
in detention on May 17 when the court appointed an independent
fingerprint examiner to review the FBI’s identification.110 On May 19, the
independent examiner agreed with the FBI’s identification and became at
least the fourth examiner to positively link Mayfield to the suspect print. 111
Yet, on the same day, the Spanish National Police notified the FBI that it
had positively matched the fingerprint with Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian
national.112 The court released Mayfield the next day to be detained at
home; the FBI withdrew its identification on May 24, and the case against
Mayfield was dismissed.113
OIG ultimately found multiple sources for the FBI lab’s error.114 One
source of error concerned facts specific to the case—such as the similarity
between the identified prints and Mayfield’s religious background.115
Another source concerned general problems with the fingerprint
identification process—including its reliance on extremely tiny details,
inadequate explanations for differences, failure to assess the poor quality of
the similarities, and failure to reexamine the fingerprints after the Spanish
National Police investigation returned a negative result.116 While the
Mayfield case may seem like an outlier, it remains true that serious errors in
supposedly reliable and accurate methodology nearly perpetrated a
miscarriage of justice. Brandon Mayfield’s case is a high-profile example
of a systemic problem that likely increases in frequency when the case is
105
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See id.
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See id.
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See id. at 6.
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See id. at 6–7, 12 (noting that Mayfield’s religion “likely contributed to the
examiners’ failure to sufficiently reconsider the identification after legitimate questions
about it were raised”).
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See id. at 8–10.
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merely average, neither implicating national security nor requiring multiple
reviews of the evidence. Perhaps what makes Mayfield’s case the
exception is not that forensic science got it wrong but that investigators
figured out the errors before the man was convicted. Still, these errors
resulted in an innocent man being investigated and detained. Further, the
resources of the FBI and other investigatory organizations were wasted on
pursuing a meritless lead.
Even beyond the Mayfield blemish, additional work is beginning to
demonstrate that fingerprint analysis has been undermined by its own
methodology.117 The NAS Report cites Lyn and Ralph Haber’s paper in
which they conclude: “We have reviewed the available scientific evidence
of the validity of the ACE-V method [of latent fingerprint identification]
and found none.”118 The development of the ACE-V method119 itself has a
curious chronology. It was conveniently adopted after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, which refused to distinguish
technical testimony (including fingerprint identification) from scientific
evidence, making technical testimony subject to the rigors of Daubert.120
The decision effectively removed the cloak of invisibility for some forensic
disciplines that rested on “technical experience,” rather than scientific
methods as the foundation for the expert opinion.121
Suddenly, latent print examiners needed some sort of method in
addition to an abundance of experience and a good set of eyes.
Consequently (and conveniently), the ACE-V method was born. But it is
not in the family of scientific analysis that the term “method” might
otherwise indicate. Despite widespread propaganda that promotes ACE-V
as a scientific method, fingerprint analysis lacks validated standards and
testing with respect to the process and the level of reliability needed to draw

117

For a critique of fingerprint analysis technique, see generally Epstein, supra note 102.
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 (quoting Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber,
Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87,
105 (2008)).
119
One technique used to examine fingerprints is referred to as the “ACE-V” method
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conclusions about the relative similarity between two prints.122 A recent
study has shown that when identical fingerprint evidence is presented to the
same set of examiners for analysis, they reach different conclusions
approximately 10% of the time.123
Moreover, the “V” in ACE-V (which stands for “verification”) was
meant to address the need for peer review, but the slipshod fix ignores the
vulnerabilities of cognitive bias replete in fingerprint analysis. The
Mayfield case highlighted this particular weakness, but it is not an isolated
incident and it is not limited to fingerprint analysis. Context influences
many aspects of the forensic process. Forensic examiners may be aware of
the nature and details of the particular crime or the suspect, pressured by an
investigator to find a match between samples, or apprised of prior
conclusions drawn by colleagues working on the same piece of evidence
(the peer review). All of these factors can contribute to contextual bias.124
The contextual stimuli that permeate forensic science may be subtle or
flagrant, but they are omnipresent. Mayfield’s erroneous identification
exemplified the gravity of forensic bias: “the latent fingerprint was
examined against a pre-existing ‘target,’ without first being properly
analyzed in isolation; the examiners were pre-armed with contextual
information, leading them to be suspicious of their target; and the case was
high in profile and time-urgent, increasing the need for closure.”125 Couple
the bias component with the possibility for false positives, and the threat of
a wrongful conviction based on flawed fingerprint evidence is very real.
D. CRIME LAB CONTAGION: A CULTURE OF CUTTING CORNERS

In recent years, a number of shocking crime lab scandals have gained
media attention and grabbed headlines. The cases appear to encompass
errors ranging from mere negligence to outright malfeasance and occur in
labs all over the country. Accusations involve evidence tampering,126
perjury,127 and withholding evidence.128 Such charges are often linked to a
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See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 131 (2008).
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See Bradford T. Ulery et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent
Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PLoS ONE 1, 6 (2012).
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See Kassin et al., supra note 42, at 43.
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31, 2013, at B2.
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See, e.g., Madeleine Baran, Ramsey County Medical Examiner Michael McGee
Under Investigation, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 6, 2011), http://goo.gl/5G5El7.
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JUST. MAG., Spring 2012, at 43, available at http://goo.gl/yL6IEb.
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particular person or even section within the crime lab. The problem of one,
however, becomes the pestilence for many, because a crime lab is the sum
of its collective parts. When one part is infected, it can bring down the
entire organism.
As with the individual forensic disciplines, crime labs also lack any
cohesive set of mandatory standards. Depending on the crime lab, this
creates a quality control issue.129 The crime lab accreditation process—
which implies reviews, testing, and audits—is, at best, voluntary and, at
worst, a charitable endowment. Many states do not require their crime labs
to be accredited.130 Those labs that do seek accreditation do so through the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation
Board (ASCLD/LAB), the primary certifying body for crime labs. In 1996,
Peter Neufeld—cofounder of the Innocence Project—observed that
“[t]here’s absolutely no reason that crime laboratories, which routinely
make decisions that have life and death consequences for an accused
person, should be less regulated than a clinical laboratory utilizing similar
tests.”131
The NAS Report noted the lack of standards for lab management and
administration.132 Specifically, it observed:
There is no uniformity in the certification of forensic practitioners, or in the
accreditation of crime laboratories. Indeed, most jurisdictions do not require forensic
practitioners to be certified, and most forensic science disciplines have no mandatory
certification programs. Moreover, accreditation of crime laboratories is not required
in most jurisdictions. Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic
practice in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place . . . they often
are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way. 133

History demonstrates that if a lab produces errors (on any scale), it is
unlikely to affect its accreditation from ASCLD/LAB. A member of the
New York Forensic Science Commission criticized ASCLD/LAB for its
“culture of tolerance for errors stemming from a highly forgiving
corrections system, some times of major and/or lesser magnitudes, but
many of which either violate ASCLD/LAB’s ethics guidelines and/or
standards.”134 Indeed, by its own terms, ASCLD/LAB does not conduct
129
See Justin Peters, The Unsettling, Underregulated World of Crime Labs, SLATE (Jan.
14, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://goo.gl/YZwUSX.
130
See id.
131
Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis: Evidence Backlog Imperils Justice,
USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1996, at 1A.
132
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
133
Id.
134
See Memorandum from Marvin E. Schechter on ASCLD/LAB and Forensic Lab.
Accreditation to Members of the N.Y. State Comm’n of Forensic Sci. 23 (Mar. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://goo.gl/kXZGgs.
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random inspections of crime labs.135 Labs always get notice of a visit, and
the lab itself selects the case files for review.136
Reminiscent of the mortgage industry’s countercyclical diversification
strategy (which produced the housing bubble), ASCLD offers a wealth of
services to its member labs, “such as protection from outside inquiry,
shielding of internal activities and where necessary, especially in the event
of public condemnation, a spokesperson to buffer the laboratory from media
inquiry.”137 In other words, when times are bad for a crime lab, ASCLD
still reaps benefits from member labs. Crime lab accreditation is a forprofit business that sorely needs an overhaul, but it likely is not the root
cause of crime lab scandals.
What makes forensic error into a full-blown crime lab scandal? As
with any scandal that brings down an organization, it usually includes
repetitive misconduct, a failure to respond, and a culture of tolerance of
such activity.138 The situations that push an incident from the “problem”
column to the “scandal” column are varied and diverse. Examiners may lie
about test results,139 produce misleading data regarding the reliability of
their methods,140 or conceal exculpatory evidence.141 Other cases may
involve “dry-labbing,” where analysts record data for tests that they never
conducted.142 Protocols may be ignored, forensic scientists may exaggerate
their credentials or expertise, or tests may be tampered with.
Whatever the particular problem, it cannot be denied that between
2005 and 2011, authorities identified fifty significant failures at American
crime labs.143 These types of problems have led to scandals across the
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nation, resulting in full or partial closures, reorganizations, investigations,
or firings at city or county crime labs.144
To highlight some recent examples of flawed testing, for example,
Detroit in 2008 shut down its crime lab when an audit revealed errors in
10% of cases.145 In 2010, an audit revealed that technicians in a North
Carolina lab provided false or misleading results in 190 murder or similarly
serious cases.146 In 2011, New York shut down a state crime lab after an
investigation revealed that the lab had engaged in flawed testing for
MDMA (more commonly known as ecstasy), triggering review of 9,000
cases.147 Authorities were aware of issues with the crime lab as far back as
2008.148
In some cases, analysts have stolen evidence for personal use.149 San
Francisco crime lab technician Deborah Madden admitted to taking cocaine
from evidence.150 Police arrested Massachusetts chemist Sonja Farak on
similar charges related to both cocaine and heroin earlier in 2013.151 The
need for standard protocol and oversight in state-run crime labs has never
been more apparent.
Other analysts tamper with evidence, effectively committing fraud, to
attain professional recognition.152 Chemist Annie Dookhan (also in

144
For a list of crime lab scandals, see Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 728 n.5. From
2005 to 2011, there were at least fifty serious failures at U.S. crime labs, with more than half
attributable to ASCLD/LAB-certified labs. See Memorandum, supra note 134, at 14. Since
2011, crime lab failures continue to mount. See Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the
Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1,
2013, 5:20 AM), available at http://goo.gl/BSno1q.
145
See Error-Prone Detroit Crime Lab Shut Down, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2008, 10:34
PM), http://goo.gl/Ku3Pb2. In response to the crime lab’s scandal, a Detroit prosecutor said,
“As prosecutors, we completely rely on the findings of police crime lab experts every day in
court, and we present this information to our juries . . . . [W]hen there are failures of this
magnitude, there is a complete betrayal of trust. We feel betrayed, as prosecutors.” Id.
146
See John Rudolf, Scandal-Plagued North Carolina Crime Lab Sued by Exonerated
Man, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://goo.gl/7fFo13.
147
See New York County Crime Lab Closed Down in Probe, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2011,
5:16 PM), http://goo.gl/TkCScp.
148
See STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION INTO THE NASSAU
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT FORENSIC EVIDENCE BUREAU 105 (2011), available at
http://goo.gl/HRoKBv.
149
See, e.g., Second Mistrial Declared in SF Crime Lab Scandal, ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 31,
2013), http://goo.gl/GYLIGE.
150
See id.
151
See Elizabeth Roman, Chemist Charged; Crime Lab Closed, THE REPUBLICAN, Jan.
21, 2013, at A1.
152
See Sally Jacobs, Chasing Renown on a Path Paved with Lies, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
3, 2013, at A1.
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Massachusetts) was responsible for the lab’s quality control.153 Authorities
discovered that she manipulated evidence to obtain false positives.154
Dookhan was renowned for her “preternatural speed.”155 She analyzed an
astonishing 500 samples per month, while the average forensic chemist
makes it through 50 to 150 samples in the same amount of time. 156 Her
supersonic speed, however, was anything but the result of superior skill.
Dookhan admitted that she cut corners and rarely respected lab protocol.157
One of Dookhan’s supervisors noted that she “did not seem to use a
microscope, which is necessary to confirm that a substance is cocaine.”158
Dookhan further admitted to sprinkling samples submitted for testing with a
known illegal substance to ensure a positive result as well as testing a small
percentage of samples and then listing all the remaining samples as
positive.159 Her misconduct implicated over 30,000 defendants160 and as
many as 200 cases, which federal officials now must review.161
Ohio toxicologist James Ferguson lied about his credentials on the
witness stand hundreds of times.162 Ferguson claimed to have received his
college degree sixteen years prior to his actual graduation date.163 Ferguson
discounted the magnitude of the deception in light of his twenty-plus-years’
experience.164 One cannot help but wonder what else Ferguson has lied
about, given his willingness to perjure himself over something he
characterized as minor. If he lied about evidence, Ferguson would not be
alone in committing perjury to bolster prosecutors’ cases. Michael Hansen
153
See Denise Lavoie, Lawyers Expect Appeals in Mass. Crime Lab Case, BOSTON.COM
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://goo.gl/wmEAyV.
154
See Lavoie, supra note 126.
155
See Peters, supra note 129.
156
See Lavoie & Niedowski, supra note 139.
157
See Matt Murphy, Chemist at Center of Drug Lab Case Told Police She “Messed Up
Bad,” EAGLE TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://goo.gl/SbjcvD.
158
Justin Peters, No National Crime Lab Standards, THE REPUBLICAN (Jan. 20, 2013,
6:05 PM), http://goo.gl/MIeA5w.
159
See Lavoie & Niedowski, supra note 139.
160
See Peters, supra note 158.
161
Milton J. Valencia et al., Scope of Lab Scandal Widens, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13,
2012, at B1.
162
See Former Toxicologist Sentenced for Lying About Credentials, 10TV.COM (May 18,
2010, 11:07 AM), http://goo.gl/Kwm1UI. Dookhan also lied about her credentials at various
stages of her career. See Jacobs, supra note 152. Dookhan at one point claimed to have a
master’s degree and said she was working toward a doctoral degree from Harvard—neither
of which was true. See id. “She inflated her salary and gave herself grandiose job titles,
referring to herself in an e-mail as ‘an on-call supervisor for chemical and biological
terrorism.’” Id.
163
See Former Toxicologist Sentenced for Lying About Credentials, supra note 162.
164
See id.
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served six years for the murder of his daughter before a judge found that the
medical examiner, Dr. Michael McGee, testified falsely in Hansen’s trial.165
The prosecution ultimately dropped the charges.166
In addition to problems spawning from overt misconduct in crime labs,
their close connection to law enforcement can result in policies favoring the
prosecution. For example, North Carolina’s crime lab recently came under
fire for a policy of withholding certain results from defense attorneys.167 In
situations where an initial sample tested positive as blood, the lab would
withhold any subsequent negative tests—even where the later tests were
more specific.168 According to an FBI report, the “North Carolina crime lab
workers omitted, overstated or falsely reported blood evidence over a 16year period.”169
The harms caused by errant crime labs are often compounded by their
lack of transparency, and some are outright attributable to hiding
evidence.170 Labs often can be more concerned with reputation than with
rectifying wrongs (which requires informing defendants of the error(s)).
These troubling issues exact enormous costs. When scandals do come to
light, the criminal justice system must reexamine huge numbers of past
convictions.171 Annie Dookhan, for example, was directly involved with at
least one hundred cases in one federal district court alone.172 As many as
500 or more cases in which she was involved may eventually have to be
reviewed.173 Ultimately, once state court cases and cases invoking the
mandatory minimum sentencing requirements based on state convictions
165

See Baran, supra note 127.
See Madeleine Baran, Court Drops Charges Against Man Awaiting Retrial for
Daughter’s Murder, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 16, 2011), http://goo.gl/yOOZhZ.
167
See Giannelli, supra note 128. Even where there is not a stated policy favoring law
enforcement, the personal relationships between prosecutors and crime labs can instill a
sense of loyalty toward the prosecution. Again, Dookhan’s case is instructive. A string of emails between the disgraced chemist and state prosecutors revealed that Dookhan saw her
role as anything but a neutral scientist. See Andrea Estes & Scott Allen, Chemist Built Up
Ties to Prosecutors, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2012, at A1 (“Dookhan . . . viewed herself as
part of the prosecution team, the e-mails show. She coached assistant district attorneys on
trial strategy and told one that her goal was ‘getting [drug dealers] off the streets.’”).
Another district attorney resigned over a string of suggestive e-mails with Dookhan. See id.
168
See Giannelli, supra note 128.
169
Jessica Hopper, Feds: North Carolina Crime Lab Buried Blood Evidence, ABC NEWS
(July 18, 2010), http://goo.gl/ejqesP.
170
See id.
171
See, e.g., Massachusetts Forensics Chief Tells Legislators Crime Lab Scandals
Contributed to Two-year Backlog, THE REPUBLICAN (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:03 PM),
http://goo.gl/9cfSn3.
172
See Valencia, supra note 161.
173
See id.
166
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are considered, the toll for review is estimated to reach approximately
34,000 cases.174 In the cases that had been reviewed as of January 2013,
courts overturned 1,141 convictions where Dookhan handled evidence.175
The scandal was expected to cost the state more than $40 million.176 Of
that, the Massachusetts judiciary reportedly requested about $13.6 million
to deal with the scandal.177 These figures likely exclude the expenses for
the public defenders needed in many of these cases.178
At a time when the federal and state governments bemoan declining
revenues, it seems far more efficient to ensure labs are adequately resourced
in the first instance than to divert money cleaning up messes after the fact.
But no matter their gravity, the problems that plague crime labs also exact
substantial nonmonetary costs. Not only are internal investigations still
required to ferret out tainted samples,179 but more importantly, the integrity
of the criminal justice system is eroded. These scandals undermine
society’s faith in a fair and just system. And, of course, the human cost of
forensic errors is greatest of all. There is no way to quantify the pain
suffered by innocent people incarcerated for crimes they did not commit. It
is also well worth remembering that in crimes where there is a victim, every
innocent person wrongfully convicted means a guilty person is allowed to
go free.
While these are but a few in a laundry list of crime lab errors,
collectively, they underscore the need for greater oversight and increased
accountability. The continued failure to address these problems exacts too
high a toll.

174
See Jacobs, supra note 152. Some estimates run as high as 34,000 tainted cases. See
Valencia, supra note 161. As of February 2013, nearly 300 offenders had been released.
See Jacobs, supra note 152.
175
See Peters, supra note 129.
176
See John R. Ellement, Costs Climb in State Drug Lab Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
26, 2012, at A1.
177
See id.
178
See id. (detailing only that expenses would be used to hire retired judges, assistant clerk
magistrates, case specialists, law clerks, probation officers, and associate probation officers).
179
Cf. Roman, supra note 151.
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II. GROUNDHOG DAY: ATTEMPTS AT REFORMING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES
“Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different
results.”180

In the aftermath of the NAS Report and the rise in reporting of crime
lab errors (whether it is a true increase versus an uptick in reporting is
subject to debate), it seems that U.S. forensic reform is in its infancy stages.
While the NAS Report proposed a federal reshaping of forensic science
services, it was not the first entreaty into reform. Legislation has tiptoed
around forensic issues for decades, with little to no success. Most
legislation targeted labs rather than forensic science as an industry. The
year 2012, however, saw a shift in legislation proposing research, standards,
and oversight, as opposed to dumping more money into labs.
A. TREATING SYMPTOMS INSTEAD OF THE CAUSE: THE EARLY YEARS
OF FORENSIC REFORM

The abysmal state of crime labs first gained national attention in 1967
when President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice found that many police labs lacked both
equipment and expertise.181 During the Nixon Administration, a 1973
commission echoed many of these same concerns.182 A few years later, the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice garnered
nationwide media attention with its finding that scores of crime labs were
underperforming.183 Identifying weaknesses, however, does little to
actually effectuate change in the absence of funds to accomplish those
improvements. This lack of funding is a continuous theme in the
chronology of forensic reform legislation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the answer to performance issues seemed to
be a differential diagnosis of treating symptoms rather than causes by the
provision of “grants” to fund “assessments.”184 Such an ad-hoc approach
essentially threw some cash at various problems to incentivize and compel
improvements. Of course, that rarely works, and the early attempts at
reform were just that—attempts.

180
RITA MAE BROWN, SUDDEN DEATH 68 (1983) (reciting a quote often misattributed to
Albert Einstein, Benjamin Franklin, or Mark Twain).
181
See Kenneth E. Melson, Embracing the Path Forward: The Journey to Justice
Continues, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 197, 199 (2010).
182
See id.
183
See id.
184
See id.
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B. THE CASH COW: FUNDING LINKED TO DNA TESTING

Despite the evidence of widespread performance lapses among crime
labs, Congress largely remained silent on the issue until the use of DNA in
criminal investigations gained prominence.185 Competing views over DNA
evidence admissibility led to a 1992 report by the National Academy of
Sciences.186 A 1996 follow-up report revealed that DNA tests were both
scientifically valid and reliable.187 The follow-up report, in concert with the
standards for admissibility established by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,188 resulted in a rise in the use of DNA in criminal
trials—and a corresponding uptick in regulating legislation.189
After the follow-up report, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
joined forces with the Office of Law Enforcement Standards to fund the
“Forensic Summit: Roadmap to the Year 2000.”190 The summit resulted in
a report outlining persistent deficiencies in most public crime labs.191 The
report called for greater standardization, increased research, and quality
controls in labs.192
The report notwithstanding, DNA continued to become the so-called
gold standard in law enforcement and this new reverence—bordering on
obsession—meant the vast majority of federal funding allocated to crime
labs was tied to DNA research.193 For example, Congress in 2000 enacted
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000194 and the Paul
Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000,195 both
185
Although little federal legislation was introduced in this area, Senator Abraham
Ribicoff did present a joint resolution designating Wednesday, February 21, 1973, as a day
of honor celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences. 93 CONG. REC. 425 (1973).
186
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic
Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 53, 58; Melson, supra note 181, at 202.
187
COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996); see also Melson, supra note 181, at 202.
188
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
189
See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 58–59; Melson, supra note 181, at 202–03.
190
See Melson, supra note 181, at 199.
191
See id. at 199–200.
192
See id.
193
See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 58; Melson, supra note 181, at 203.
194
Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2012) and
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
195
Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Both Acts were first introduced in 1999. See DNA Backlog
Elimination Act, H.R. 3087, 106th Cong. (1999); National Forensic Sciences Improvement
Act of 1999, S. 1196, 106th Cong. (1999).
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meant to improve the quality of forensic science services.196 The funding
mechanisms for DNA testing far outstripped any other allotments, despite
the fact that DNA testing represents a mere fraction of crime lab work.197
Moreover, this preference for DNA-related spending did nothing to address
the persistent issues within crime labs.
The sad state of forensic labs again gained national attention a few
years later when President George W. Bush spearheaded the formation of a
forensic science commission.198 Two mechanisms created in 2004 were
supposed to carry out the President’s mandate.199 The Consolidated
Appropriations Act obligated NIJ to provide Congress with a report on the
forensic science and medical examiner communities’ needs beyond DNA
initiatives.200 That same year, the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004
(part of the Justice For All Act) tasked the Attorney General with creating a
national forensic science Commission, which would identify resource needs
beyond DNA, in addition to making recommendations, disseminating best
practices, and researching privacy issues around using DNA samples.201
Although the bill passed, the commission was never funded.202
The situation again appeared hopeful with the passage of the Science,
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2006, which authorized NAS to create a forensic science committee and
issue a report with findings and recommendations to improve the state of
forensic science.203 Among the findings previously mentioned, the NAS
Report noted “great disparities among existing forensic science operations
in federal, state, and local law enforcement jurisdictions and agencies.”204
The differences pertained to funding, access to analytical instrumentation,
the availability of skilled and well-trained personnel, certification,
accreditation, and oversight.205 In the chronology of forensic reform, the
NAS Report did much to gain national attention to an issue first
acknowledged—but
not
much
improved—since
the
Johnson
Administration.206
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See Melson, supra note 181, at 201–02.
See id. at 203.
198
See id. at 200.
199
See id. at 200–01.
200
See id.
201
See id. at 201; see also 42 U.S.C. § 14136c(b)(1)–(9) (2006).
202
See Melson, supra note 181, at 201–02.
203
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1; see also Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2005).
204
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
205
See id. at 6.
206
See Melson, supra note 181, at 204–05.
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C. FORENSIC REFORM 3.0: A GRAVEYARD OF GOOD IDEAS

If the NAS Report’s release can be viewed as a watershed moment,
then the legislation it spawned might be viewed as the third iteration of
proposed forensic reform. A few days prior to the release of the NAS
Report, Representative Peter Roskam introduced the State and Local
Criminal Forensic Laboratory Enhancement Act of 2009.207 Despite the
national attention garnered by the NAS findings, the bill never made it out
of committee. President Barack Obama responded by chartering a
subcommittee on forensic science.208 That subcommittee’s role was to
make recommendations to achieve the goals the NAS Report outlined.209
But DNA testing remained the focus of most legislation and received the
lion’s share of funding through the 111th Congress.210
Two years later, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Criminal Justice
and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011.211 The bill, which also died in
committee,212 would have established an Office of Forensic Science within
DOJ.213 In 2012 and again in 2013, Representative Eddie Bernice
introduced legislation to “establish scientific standards and protocols across
forensic disciplines.”214 The Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013
(Standards Act)— and its 2012 predecessor215—intends to create “a national
207
H.R. 898, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). A previous version was introduced in 2007.
H.R. 3151, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
208
COMM. ON SCI., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
FORENSIC SCIENCES ([hereinafter CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCE],
available at http://goo.gl/VYNFqf; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic
Science Report: A Literature Review 2 (Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 2012-11, 2012), available at http://goo.gl/s1r4sY.
209
See CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 208, at 1–2.
The charter for the subcommittee was renewed in March 2012. See COMM. ON SCI., NAT’L
SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCES, available at
http://goo.gl/8sulyA.
210
Aside from the COPS Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 1139, 111th Cong. (2009),
which also died in committee, see H.R. 1139 (111th): COPS Improvements Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/kysjEM (last visited Apr. 14, 2014), the majority of legislation
pertaining to forensics centered on DNA. See, e.g., Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence
Registry (SAFER) Act of 2010, H.R. 6085, 111th Cong. (2010) (stating an intention to
amend the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 and establish a forensic evidence
registry for sexual assault).
211
S. 132, 112th Cong. (2011).
212
See S. 132 (112th): Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011,
GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/olr4GE (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
213
See S. 132 § 101(a).
214
See Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. (2013);
Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2012, H.R. 6106, 112th Cong. (2012).
215
In 2012, Senator John D. “Jay” Rockefeller IV and Representative Eddie Bernice
introduced companion legislation in the House and the Senate. See S. 3378, 112th Cong.
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forensic science research program to improve, expand, and coordinate
Federal research in the forensic sciences.”216 In addition, the Standards Act
would establish both a national forensic science coordinating office at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and a forensic
science advisory committee.217 Unlike in Senator Leahy’s bill, which
would place the forensic science office within DOJ, both the NIST director
and the Attorney General would create the advisory committee, which, in
turn, would advise DOJ and NIST.218
Notwithstanding the failed 2012 Standards Act, the resurrected
Standards Act is notable for its trailblazing approach to tackling forensic
reform in a manner that prior legislation had not. The Act aims to fix
forensic science by encouraging research, adopting standards, and creating
accreditation requirements. The legislation, however, suffers from its
corpulent proportions, despite its ambitious objectives. Aside from the
historical failure rate of forensic reforms, the legislation is problematic
because it would effectively birth a Lernaean Hydra with a multitude of
agencies, committees, and other entities that border on redundancy and
grandiosity. It would create a chaotic assemblage of organizations by
establishing new entities under the auspices of the existing National Science
Foundation (NSF) and NIST.
The NAS Report observed that a lack of quality, peer-reviewed
forensic science research stymies advancements in the field. To address
this deficit, the Standards Act would create a research program, which
would direct research efforts in the forensic sciences from a variety of
federal groups.219 In addition to the research program, NIST would house a
coordinating office, the purpose of which would be to produce a “unified
Federal research strategy” that identifies and prioritizes research goals
consistent with the NAS Report and to develop a roadmap to achieve
them.220 Specifically, the roadmap is intended to establish the criteria that
the coordinating office would use to assess research progress. The
(2012). Senator Rockefeller again introduced the bill before the 113th Congress on Feb. 12,
2014. The bill, S. 2022, was reported out of committee on April 9, 2014. See S. 2022:
Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/esJ7EK (last visited
Apr. 14, 2014).
216
H.R. 3064 § 4(a).
217
See id. §§ 4, 8. The prognosis for the bill’s success appeared bleak; a legislation
tracking website reported that the House bill had a 1% chance of being enacted. See H.R.
3064: Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/0973CJ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014). The Senate bill had a 28% of being enacted. See S. 2022: Forensic
Science and Standards Act of 2014, supra note 215.
218
See H.R. 3064 § 8(b), (d).
219
See id. § 4(a).
220
See id. § 4(c)(2).
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coordinating office also would have oversight responsibility for the research
program and would submit reports to Congress to identify and make
recommendations regarding areas of forensic science that would benefit
from further research.
The Standards Act also would provide NSF with a research grant
program at an operating budget of $34 million for fiscal year 2014,
increasing by $3 million each year until 2018.221 On top of the tremendous
budget allocation, the most ambitious aspect of the Standards Act would be
the creation of one or more new forensic science research centers under the
auspices of the NSF.222 The Standards Act would establish the research
center for four specific purposes: (1) to develop a plan to unify forensic
research across federal agencies; (2) to “build relationships between
forensic science practitioners and members of the research community”; (3)
to promote education of individuals with the aim of creating leaders in the
forensic sciences; and (4) to disseminate their work.223
Collecting a few more federal entities to add to the convention-like
atmosphere, the Standards Act provides for additional forensic roles within
the confines of the NIST. Responding to the NAS Report’s concerns about
disparate forensic science results, the Standards Act requires NIST to
develop “forensic science standards to enhance the validity and reliability of
forensic science activities.”224
Such activities encompass uniform
measurements and criteria both for the methods and tools forensic scientists
use.225 Further, the Standards Act would saddle NIST with standardizing
the terminology forensic scientists use in their reports, providing for
interoperability of forensic science databases, testing and validating existing
standards, and independently validating “forensic science measurements
and methods.”226
To add to the confusion, the Standards Act would establish an advisory
committee under the supervision of NIST, the NSF, and the Attorney
General to counsel federal departments, agencies, and offices. The
committee would consist of an interdisciplinary array of scientists and
lawyers. To achieve these ends, the NIST director would be given free rein
to establish working groups to “identify gaps, areas of need, and
opportunities for standards development.”227 The Standards Act would

221
222
223
224
225
226
227

See id. § 5.
See id. § 5(c)(1).
See id.
Id. § 7(a)(1)(B).
See id.
See id. § 7(a)(1)(B), (C).
See id. § 7(b)(1).
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allocate NIST a budget of $5 million for 2014, $12 million for 2015, $20
million for 2016, $27 million for 2017, and $35 million for 2018.228
The final piece to this forensic puzzle concerns the Attorney General’s
role. The Standards Act would provide the Attorney General with
lackluster enforcement powers. While the Act requires the Attorney
General to enforce forensic standards developed under the Act at the federal
level, the Attorney General is relegated in nonfederal labs to “encouraging”
and “promoting” powers that (in a better translation) merely suggest that
nonfederal labs adopt the standards and promote certification and
accreditation criteria.229 Since the Standards Act effectively holds the cash
hostage at the federal level, all other labs would have little incentive to
implement any new standards or accreditation measures. Simply put, the
Act lacks any “buy in” for the little (i.e., nonfederal) guys.
On the one hand, the Standards Act’s broad agenda would accomplish
several things. It identifies the need for research, showcases the utility of
research centers, and underscores the basic requirement of standards.
Unfortunately, similar earlier versions of the bill died in committee, so this
iteration may become another obituary in the history of forensic reform,
likely doomed by a lack of political capital and a steep price tag.
Consequently, the Act may very well be a classic example of an unrealistic
wish list that no one can afford.
In a post-script to the demise of the Forensic Science Standards Act of
2012, Senator Leahy indicated his commitment to forensic reform in an
early 2013 speech.230 This afterthought, at the very least, dovetailed into a
development where, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, DOJ
announced that it would partner with NIST to create a National
Commission on Forensic Science.231 The role that commission will play in
the ongoing debate on forensic reform remains unclear.
III. TOO BIG TO FAIL: OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL FORENSIC OVERSIGHT
Against the backdrop of failed forensic legislation, a myriad of
forensic standards remain across the multitude of forensic science
disciplines.232 The NAS Report concluded that these problems could “only
228

See id. § 7(c).
See id. § 9(1), (2); S. 3378, 112th Cong. § 9(1)(B) (2012).
230
Senator Patrick Leahy, The Agenda of the Senate Judiciary Committee for the 113th
Congress, Address at Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 16, 2013), available at
http://goo.gl/j1UsTR.
231
Notice of Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership, 78 Fed. Reg. 12355 (Feb. 22, 2013).
232
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (“The forensic science disciplines currently are
an assortment of methods and practices used in both the public and private arenas.”).
229
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be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure
that supports the forensic science community in this country.”233 After the
Report’s release, other scholars and forensic science experts called for a
national entity or entities to provide national forensic science standards,234
but consensus on how to best accomplish this has remained an uncatchable
shadow. Indeed, many forensic science practitioners disagreed with a
federal entity running the show.235 Consequently, the Standards Act
highlights the problem of too many ideas floating about to translate into one
workable system.
Even assuming a slight consensus that a federal entity should (or
could) promulgate national forensic standards,236 two questions remain: (1)
whether the federal government has the power to effectively create and
enforce such standards; and (2) if so, how such a program should operate.
This Part offers attempts to answer both. First, the federal government
likely has the power to regulate at least parts of the forensic science
community, but it would need support from state and federal courts to
enforce the standards it promulgates. Second, I submit that even with
judicial support and the express authority to cram federal legislation down
the state pipeline, resistance would be stiff, and the requisite buy-in from
crime labs and forensic organizations is lacking.
A. FEDERAL POWER TO MANDATE STANDARDS

Congress could attempt to mandate federal standards on its own.
Under Gonzales v. Raich, Congress has the power to regulate even
noneconomic goods if it does so as part of a commercial regulatory
scheme.237 This could give Congress some latitude to regulate parts of the
233

See id. at xx.
See Gabel & Champion, supra note 29, at 26–27 (arguing that a federal agency
should be created to regulate forensic services nationwide now, before states establish their
own schemes); Melson, supra note 181, at 207 (arguing in favor of a national forensic
science agency to reside within DOJ); see also Donovan & Ungvarsky, supra note 18, at 27
(“[T]he NAS Report has created a window of opportunity for defense counsel to demand
meaningful reform on all fronts . . . .”).
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See, e.g., Ryan M. Goldstein, Note, Improving Forensic Science Through State
Oversight, 90 TEX. L. REV. 225, 234 (2011) (arguing that stronger state-level oversight
would help with current problems in forensic sciences).
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Several national forensic science organizations already exist in different disciplines,
including the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), the American Society of
Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), the International Association for Identification (IAI),
and the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). See STATUS AND NEEDS,
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the extent to which they share requirements, standards, or policies.” NAS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 16.
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See 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005).
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forensic science community. For example, Congress might choose to
regulate instruments used in forensic science analysis, because it would
have a rational basis for regulating their creation and use. But the power to
regulate commerce would have its limits,238 especially related to research.
One of the most critical needs in the forensic science community is for
research into standards and protocols.239 Congress could perhaps fund its
own research into these areas (as it suggests in Forensic Science Standards
Act), but mandating the direction of university-level research likely would
be beyond the scope of Congress’s power, even if it were politically
feasible.
Congress is also limited either politically or constitutionally in what it
can do to mandate what state and local courts admit as evidence.240 Even if
Congress could significantly affect the landscape of the forensic science
community through mandates, much of its effect would diminish if state
and local courts did not adopt the same standards.
B. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT CREATES NATIONAL STANDARDS

Enforcing national standards in federal courts is a direct method of
encouraging their adoption in the states. To make this happen, a federal
forensic science agency first could consider the current Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) and advise Congress on changes needed for properly
implementing national standards in federal courts. Next, mandating these
modifications as forensic evidence standards in federal courts would
provide for significant, positive changes.
Terminology, reporting,
operational principles, and other processes could be standardized in federal
court, providing for more efficiency, less juror confusion, more accurate
outcomes, and less time spent litigating. Further, many of the federal-level
changes would positively impact standards at state and local levels, because
some state and local agencies rely on the same labs as federal law
enforcement agencies.241 Thus, changing standards in the shared labs
would benefit agencies at all levels. Finally, federally mandating crime lab
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I make no guarantees regarding the ultimate constitutionality of such regulations. That
debate is better saved for a far-off day when the passage of such legislation appears realistic.
239
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
240
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947, 952 (2001) (arguing that “Congress has no authority to prescribe procedural rules
for state courts to follow in state law cases”).
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See, e.g., Crime Laboratory, NEBRASKA.GOV, http://goo.gl/awzdMy (last visited Apr.
14, 2014) (“The Division . . . serves all local, county, state, federal and military law
enforcement agencies in Nebraska.”); Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory, UNIV. R.I.,
http://goo.gl/5AVYHN (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) (“The RISCL has defined its customer base
as all appropriate agencies investigating evidence relating to federal, state or local crimes.”).
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technician certifications as part of this process would result in an increased
demand for colleges and universities to offer courses for students to pursue
those certifications. The resulting increase in educational opportunities
would allow more state and local forensic scientists to receive the same
education as their federal counterparts.
But enforcing evidentiary standards in federal courts would only be the
first positive step in achieving national forensic standards. Perhaps some
states would adopt the FRE changes, but not all states base their rules of
evidence on the FRE;242 thus the changes may not receive universal, or even
significant, adoption. Moreover, states’ lack of resources would also slow
adoption. As it is, local and state forensic science services are underfunded
and backlogged.243 Many labs have neither the time nor the funds to
transition to a uniform, FRE-guided system. Finally, implementing national
evidence standards would also create political resistance in many states,
especially under current economic conditions.
Without an ability to truly mandate the same changes at the state and
local level, imposing new forensic evidence standards would only get part
of the way toward a truly national system of forensic science. Moreover,
adopting and applying standards and practices rooted in federal origins
takes time.244 This FRE approach would have to be combined with another
approach, such as tying federal funding for forensic science initiatives to the
adoption of national standards.
C. TIE FEDERAL FUNDS TO ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS

1. Constitutionality of Tying Federal Funding to Related Programs
Tying federal funding to the adoption of standards is another, less
direct method to create effective national forensic standards. Congress
employed this method before to coerce states to adopt a drinking age of
twenty-one. Passed in 1984, the National Minimum Drinking Age Act
242
6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2013) (“Forty-two states . . . have
adopted rules of evidence patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
243
Jackson Holtz, Backlog Swells at Washington State Crime Lab, SEATTLETIMES.COM
(Jan. 17, 2010, 8:39 PM), http://goo.gl/ka3xCc (“On average, it takes state experts more than
six months to complete ballistics tests in cases involving firearms.”); Melissa Maynard,
Collection of DNA Evidence Grows, As Does Need for Federal Funding, WASH. POST, Mar.
19, 2012, at A13 (noting that “major backlogs persist”). But see Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013) (asserting that technological advances are substantially reducing
delays in processing DNA from arrestees).
244
By way of example, Georgia changed its rules of evidence in May 2011 to reflect the
federal rules. H.B. 24, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011). The new rules did not go
into effect until January 1, 2013.
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provided that any state that lowered its drinking age below twenty-one lost
10% of its federal highway funding.245
South Dakota challenged the National Minimum Drinking Age Act’s
constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole.246 The Court upheld the Act but
laid out four general restrictions on Congress’s spending power: (1) any
such “exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general
welfare”;247 (2) Congress must make its conditions on federal funds
unambiguous; (3) any condition might be illegitimate if it does not relate
“‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs’”; and (4)
other constitutional provisions might create independent bars to Congress’s
conditional grants.248 Thus, any attempt to coerce states to adopt national
forensic standards must fall within these restrictions.249
Utilizing federal spending power to create national forensic standards
would likely pass constitutional muster. First, a national forensic standards
program would be in pursuit of the general welfare. National forensic
standards would help place factually guilty criminals in jail sooner,
providing for safer communities. Relatedly, wrongful convictions would
decrease, resulting in fewer resources wasted litigating and fewer innocent
citizens behind bars. Providing clear job paths in the forensic sciences
would also streamline educational processes and attract more people to the
field. Next, Congress could easily meet the second restriction by
unambiguously writing into the legislation the conditions for federal
funding. Further, the third restriction—ensuring that the condition relates
to the particular federal interest—would also be easily met. In Dole, the
condition placed on federal highway funds was that states keep the legal
drinking age at or above twenty-one, and the Court found that this
requirement directly related to safe interstate travel, the main purpose of
highway funding.250 Here, the condition would be to follow a national
forensic standards program, which is directly related to creating national
forensic standards, the main purpose of the funding. Finally, none of the
many components of the program would likely violate other constitutional
provisions. Thus, satisfying all four restrictions, a program that tied federal
funds to state participation would be a constitutionally viable option to
encourage states to adopt national forensic standards.
245

23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).
247
Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248
Id. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
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Each portion of a national forensic standards program could theoretically be challenged,
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2. Obstacles in Using Federal Funds to Encourage Adoption of Standards
Because tying federal funding to national forensic standards might be
constitutionally permissible does not mean that it is the best or easiest
method for encouraging their adoption. There are also practical challenges,
such as getting states to act and securing a source of funding. Examining
similar programs already in place can provide guidance.
a. Adoption
The strength of a national forensic standards program would come
from it being truly national, which would (eventually) require every state to
adopt the standards. To this end, federal funding can be a powerful
motivator. For example, after the National Minimum Drinking Age Act
tied only 5% of a state’s federal highway funds to the drinking age
requirement, all fifty states complied with the condition.251 Perhaps this
quick compliance based on such a relatively small percentage of funding is
simply evidence that states can only be enticed to make decisions they were
not far from making in the first place. Even granting this assumption, there
is little evidence of strong moral resistance among the states to the idea of
national forensic standards.
Greater resistance to a federal funding program might come from
states that will not benefit from it. It is unlikely that federal funding could
cover every state’s forensic science expenditures, especially when the initial
costs to raise a state’s forensic standards to a proposed federal level are
great. Thus, some states will lack resources to effectively implement
national forensic requirements, even with federal funding.
To close the gap between current state forensic science standards and
the standards a national program would require, multiple methods of fund
distributions are necessary. Initially, federal funding directed at elevating
current state forensic standards could be offered, followed by a separate
source of funding to maintain that standard. This would help states
overcome the burden of eliminating the disparities between their current
standards and those that would be required under a federal system.
Assuming adoption could be achieved through funding, discovering a
means to pay for that funding could still present a problem.
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KATHLEEN M. S ULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (17th
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b. Source of Funds
In light of the current economic conditions and approaches to federal
spending,252 finding significant sources of funds to support a national
forensic standards program would be challenging. Arguments for such a
program should include both any cost savings and any economic stimulus
such a program would create.
As discussed, national standards would address the current forensic
systems’ inefficiencies. Erroneous criminal convictions cost the country
both in terms of what wrongly convicted defendants could otherwise
provide for society and the damage criminals who escape conviction can
cause. Moreover, the myriad of inconsistent forensic standards across the
country prevents labs, investigators, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
from seeking out more efficient and effective methods for resolving
frequently litigated forensic issues. Consistent national standards would
streamline forensic processes.
A national forensic standards program would also provide economic
stimulus. Research funding would advance our universities and research
institutions. A clear (and nationally consistent) career path for forensic
scientists would draw more students to STEM subjects and to the forensic
science field. Focusing the nation’s forensic science standards on common
goals might also create new industries and allow the United States to
become a leader in others.
c. Previous Attempts
In addition to considering the potential funding and adoption
problems, a survey of previous attempts to develop a national set of forensic
standards can provide guidance for a new endeavor. As previously
mentioned, Congress has already tied federal funds to some forensic
science initiatives. From 2000 to 2004, Congress created and expanded the
aforementioned Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Act.253 The
Coverdell Act “awards grants to states and units of local government to
help improve the quality and timeliness of forensic science and medical
examiner services.”254 In 2009 and 2010, roughly $23 million and $33
252

President Obama’s budget mentions making “tough choices to cut spending” and
needing to “put our Nation’s finances in order.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR
2014 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 5, 41 (2013).
253
See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004); 21st
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116
Stat. 1758 (2002); Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (2000).
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Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
http://goo.gl/3HvVo4 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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million were given out in Coverdell grants, respectively, but that amount
fell to less than $11 million in 2012.255
The Coverdell grant program has faced two problems that any national
forensics standards program would need to overcome. The first is its total
funding level, which would need to be significantly higher than the
Coverdell program’s $33 million high point to initiate and ultimately
maintain a national forensic standards program. The second problem is the
Coverdell system’s administration. An Innocence Project report found
enough significant problems with the program’s administration to call into
question whether it even ensured that the law’s most basic requirements
were being followed.256 Again, history does not bode well for establishing
a federal forensic agency that has authority over nonfederal forensic
stakeholders.
D. THE BUY-IN: RESISTANCE TO REFORM

Assuming that a more tempered, fiscally palatable, and constitutional
approach to a federal forensic agency is possible, the problem of “buy-in”
still has not been overcome. Stakeholders across all levels of the forensic
process would need to commit to reform. Given that the forensic process—
from crime to conviction—requires coordination and communication across
the complexity of the criminal justice system, it functions much like a
nervous system. And just as a nervous system is vulnerable to malfunction
in multiple ways, so too is the forensic process. Consequently, absent
choreographed interplay of all the individuals in the forensic nervous
system, forensic reform (let alone establishing a federal agency) would lack
the necessary support. The system requires integrity and the cooperation of
all parties. It is about more than just ironing out kinks in the circuit.
Immediately after the NAS Report’s release, several specialty forensic
organizations promulgated rapid-fire statements condemning the report, the
representative groups of the NAS committee, and the methodology that led
to their long list of recommendations. Rather than responding with reason
and authority, the organizations resorted to defensive rhetoric. In an
obvious attempt at damage control, the organizations demonstrated that any
attempt to overhaul forensic science would be met with swift and strong
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See Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program: Applications and
Awards, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2, 2013), http://goo.gl/1ioivS (reporting $23.4 million
in 2009; $33.3 million in 2010; $27.6 million in 2011; and $10.6 million in 2012).
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resistance.257 Indeed, if these groups possessed the lobbying prowess of, for
example, the National Rifle Association, they probably would have been
able to get legislation moving in the opposite direction and perhaps would
have sought to declare forensic reform unconstitutional.
As already noted, the NAS Report singled out fingerprinting and
firearms analysis, among a host of others. With regard to fingerprinting’s
ACE-V method, the Report concluded that the framework lacked
specificity, failed to prevent bias, and could not produce repeatable and
reliable results. In sum, the Report found that the process “does not
guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the same results.”258 In
response, the International Association of Identification (IAI) issued a
statement, noting that “[t]here is no research to suggest that properly trained
and professionally guided examiners cannot reliably identify whole or
partial fingerprint impressions to the person from whom they originated.”259
To a lesser degree, this sentiment was echoed by the Association of
Firearm and Toolmark Examiners (AFTE). The AFTE agreed that
deficiencies exist in the discipline, but maintained that the “NAS painted an
incomplete and inaccurate portrait of the field of firearm and toolmark
identification using a very broad brush, and in doing did not consider the
appropriate scientific principles on which our discipline is founded.”260
These examples are but two in a larger pool of responses focused on
maintaining the status quo,261 and they reveal reluctance, resistance, or even
resentment towards forensic reform. If those attitudes continue, forensic
reform—whether federally mandated or not—will fail.
To be fair, in the years since the NAS Report, various forensic
organizations have refined their knee-jerk responses somewhat. While
perhaps falling short of love letters, they acknowledge at least an interest in
performing research to establish statistical measures for the evidence. In
fact, the IAI’s Standardization II Committee more recently recommended
that the organization:
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create a Standing Committee on probability theory and statistics as it relates to the
forensic disciplines represented by the IAI. Their charge would be to assist the
Science and Practice Committee in the acceptance and implementation of probability
modeling and to liaise with various entities such as the FBI’s Biometric Center of
Excellence, National Institute of Science and Technology, National Institute of
Justice, National Academy of Sciences and the European Network of Forensic
Science Institutes.262

The Committee also recommended that the IAI support the “pursuit of a
single internationally accepted examination methodology and standard for
conclusions.”263 Of course, one committee rarely speaks for the body as a
whole, so while there is some acquiescence to forensic reform, it is also
clear that centralized, unilateral reform may disenfranchise the very groups
that are needed to effectuate that change. But, as the following Part
demonstrates, there are other ways to accomplish a paradigm shift in
forensic science.
IV. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: REFORMING FORENSIC SCIENCE FROM ITS BASE
Given the political stalemate that likely will persist, we need to shift
the dynamic of forensic analysis from static observation to active
experimentation. This transition demands not only cooperation between
law enforcement and the legal system but must also involve scientists and
universities as active participants in the everyday world of forensic
evidence. It also requires crime labs to take accountability and ownership
of their shortcomings. Together, this would facilitate the implementation of
science-based practices and policies and would change the fundamental
relationship between research and practice, which often exist on opposite
sides of a deep chasm.
While creating a single, central entity to accomplish such cooperation
would be optimal, it also is an elusive (and perhaps imaginary) ambition at
this point. Accepting the practical obstacles for what they are and starting
at the bottom “on the frontline” of forensic science by creating research
partnerships is a more realistic and workable model. Research partnerships
would accomplish what a federal entity perhaps could not: marrying
underlying theories of forensic science with its application and practice.
These partnerships—whether with universities or research nonprofits—
would facilitate the simultaneous, informed development of forensic
science standards and frameworks in collaboration with crime labs where
actual casework is performed. By comparison, divorcing research from the
262
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practice of forensic science would have a chilling effect, because it would
become suspect to the very entities that it would be thrust upon—the
forensic labs. Thus, making crime labs part of the solution instead of telling
them that they are the problem would go a long way toward reforming
forensic science. Part IV.A first explains how research partnerships could
advance areas requiring necessary improvements, including by promoting
research and by developing standards for methodology and terminology.
Part IV.B then discusses secondary benefits that could be attained.
A. APPRECIATING THE BIG PICTURE: NONNEGOTIABLES

Until recently, most practice-driven studies of forensic techniques
were based on very simplistic methodologies and focused on
implementation rather than design.264 These studies often failed to address
key issues around technique repeatability or, equally crucial, fallibility.
After assessing whether the methodology worked, forensic labs then
diffused techniques more widely within their agencies and across agencies,
without adequately researching the real effects. Some inroads into the
process have been accomplished, but it could hardly be called a trend
toward transparency. Rather, the framework for testing forensic techniques
has traditionally been more of a symbolic activity than a real scientific
activity. By developing a transparent interpretational architecture, we may
reconstruct the forensic science technique process and understand why
issues, such as reproducibility, are not present in each and every case.
Given the increase in requests for forensic analysis in everything from
murder cases to low-level property crimes, it is becoming progressively
more expensive for crime labs to carry out the necessary work. But without
scientific bases to legitimize the value and reliability of their analyses, it is
likely that forensic evidence will continue to not only be vulnerable but also
untrustworthy. When crime labs see little value in university-level research,
there will also be few serious scientists who are interested in or know about
forensic sciences.
As compared to other public services, such as health and education,
forensic science receives little research funding outside of that provided for
DNA technology, meaning (Hollywood glamour aside) that young scientists
are unlikely to see forensics as an area of study with promise.265 This is a
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See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (outlining the need for more extensive and
scientific research in most disciplines of forensic science).
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As previously mentioned, nearly the entire NIJ budget has reflected such
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vicious cycle: the lack of priority accorded to forensic science translates
into limited investment and rewards (i.e., grant funding) and, in turn, into
limited opportunities and career prospects for scientists interested in
developing the research culture.
Perhaps the most important cost of the present state of forensic science
is that there will be a growing fissure between scientific research and
forensic practice. Forensic practice has had little scientific guidance to
date, and though much more is known today than even just a decade ago,
what is most striking is that we know little about what makes forensic
practices effective—what works, in what contexts, and at what cost.
In a system that habitually pairs crime labs with law enforcement
agencies, it makes no sense to have budgets that fail to allocate for forensic
science research and development. One might argue that the cost of
research should not be borne on a local level, but it seems unreasonable that
larger crime labs (which are, in some respects, like large medical centers)
do not see themselves as responsible for advancing and testing their
forensic practices in a scientific framework. The following Section
identifies the need for research before delving into means of accomplishing
that research through partnerships.
1. The Need for Research: From Butchers to Bakers
The NAS Report characterized the current research situation in
forensic science as a “serious problem.”266 The Report noted that although
some research has been conducted in some disciplines, “the simple reality is
that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific
studies to determine its validity.”267 Many forensic evidence disciplines
lack significant peer-reviewed research of the scientific bases for and
validity of the forensic methods.268 Fingerprint identification is one such
discipline where “sufficient data on the diagnosticity and reliability . . . do
not exist.”269
Unfortunately, not much has changed since the Report revealed this
dearth of research. As Paul Giannelli notes, the very government agencies
tasked with researching forensic sciences have manipulated their craft in the
areas of DNA profiling, fingerprint analysis, and bullet lead analysis.270
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These scholarly shortcomings, he posits, may be attributable to tight
budgets and a lack of training.271 The profound—and potentially
dangerous—absence of peer-reviewed research mutes courts’ abilities to act
as gatekeepers. Instead of properly keeping from the jury misleading
“expert evidence,” the only mechanism by which to undo the harm caused
is by cross-examining the “expert.”272 Instead of being able to easily
identify the shortcomings of self-proclaimed “experts” and properly exclude
them from the witness stand, jurors’ misconceptions about the reliability of
certain forensic analysis procedures is further strengthened by testimony
from “pseudo-experts who . . . appear legitimate.”273
Research, therefore, must become an important part of forensic
science’s infrastructure. Crime labs have the ability to create research
partnerships with outside entities. In the same sense that the teaching
hospital model combines patient care, professional training, and medical
research, we must bring universities and other research partners into crime
labs. New partnerships between forensic scientists and forensic science
researchers can build upon the university medical center model.274
Fostering these relationships may ultimately prove more fruitful than the
federal funding scramble. Examiner training and experiences remain
valuable for the assessment of tolerance and rarity; however, examiners
cannot reliably demonstrate this in a transparent manner. Furthermore,
examiners’ cognitive abilities cannot outperform the computational power
of computers. These tools can be utilized to provide measures of whether
the features, as observed and annotated, are within expected tolerance and
whether the rarity of the evidence is one that warrants a decision of
“suitability” or “identification” (when all features correspond in the
comparison). While these tools are not readily available (as they are
currently being researched and developed), once they have been
appropriately researched and validated, then those technologies may
support the decisionmaking processes inherent in forensic analysis. At

271

See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
503, 517 (2010). Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, observed how unsatisfactory training makes its way from the crime lab to the
witness stand. 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009). He noted that forensic science is not perfect but
that some of its shortfalls could be remedied through cross-examination. See id. Justice
Scalia noted that, for example, an analyst with insufficient training could be confronted on
the stand. See id. at 320. He did not take note of the fact that a jury would not likely be
persuaded to discredit that expert’s testimony when such insufficient training is the norm.
272
See Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert
Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 805 (2007).
273
Id. at 807.
274
See Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 767–68.

328

JESSICA D. GABEL

[Vol. 104

bottom, science must become a natural part of forensics and forensics must
become based in science.
2. Creating the Research Partnerships
What some might call hard sciences—such as the sciences of
engineering and biotechnology—have been slow to gain a foothold in
forensic research. Because of this, an evidence-based model, in which
standards are developed with clear scientific criteria, is lacking. Unlike
institutions dedicated to the hard sciences, crime labs do not, on the whole,
encourage their scientific staff to publish in scientific journals on
criminalistics. Instead, publication is generally discouraged, because it
might negatively affect the lab or the law enforcement agency to which it is
linked.275
Science, in this sense, is not a part of many crime labs—whether large
or small. As a result, the scientific quality of forensic analysis is often
relatively low. Crime labs do not have the resources to develop research
while also managing caseloads, tight budgets, and backlogs. In addition,
many of the issues with forensic science research stem from crime labs’
lack of independence: any facility with a research capacity is often housed
within the law enforcement agencies that exacerbate the problems with
forensic methodologies, analysis, and reporting.276 The NAS Report
concluded that these law enforcement agencies are “‘too wedded’ to the
status quo” to make good candidates for carrying out a research agenda.277
Indeed, the creation of university–crime lab partnerships to conduct forensic
research may be the only way to bolster scholarly research in the field.
Admittedly, this structure requires legwork by both crime labs and the
research partners they identify. Memorandums of understanding, a bit of
politicking, and some compromises would be needed all the way around.
Starting small and incrementally tempering the partnership through
collaboration would be a step in the right direction. Thus, the research
partnerships might choose to focus their efforts on more specific and
narrow subject matter with directed research, establishing forensic
frameworks, or standardizing terminology and reporting.
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3. Directed Research Efforts
One of the most pressing needs in nearly every forensic science
discipline is more research.278 Outside DNA analysis, very little research
has been carried out. But more consensus in other disciplines is needed
regarding the merits of the science, the protocols that should be used, and
the standards and terminology that should be adopted.279 Both areas of
forensic practice—lab-based disciplines and disciplines based on the
subjective observations of experts—likely would require different research
approaches.
Lab-based disciplines necessitate traditional, peer-reviewed research,
which is common in other disciplines outside of forensic sciences.280
Educational institutions often perform such research. Thus, a research
partnership intent on advancing forensic science in the lab-based disciplines
will need to encourage (which typically means fund) research at the
university level. To promote this research, crime labs and universities
would need to establish strong ties.281 For example, issues regarding
transparency could be addressed by clearly documenting and defining
observations and interpretations based on the evidence. Other issues,
primarily related to assessing the weight or strength of evidence (e.g.,
“suitability,” “tolerance,” and “rarity”) will require considerable support
from both the practitioner and research communities to determine the most
appropriate course of action.
Disciplines that involve subjective review of expert observations
particularly suffer from a lack of a research culture.282 Judges, for example,
are prone to inferring “scientific validity from the fact of longstanding
use.”283 Given the fact that these methods are often accepted in the
courtroom at first blush, developing a research culture for the more
subjective forensic disciplines will not only require traditional, peerreviewed research at the university level but also a focus on the scientists’

278

As Judge Harry T. Edwards, cochair of the NAS Report committee and a judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, stated, “[T]he most important part of our
committee’s report is its call for real science to support the forensic disciplines.” Harry T.
Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It Means
for the Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS 1, 9 (2010).
279
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (“The broader research community generally is
not engaged in conducting research relevant to advancing the forensic science disciplines.”).
280
Id. at 8.
281
See id. at 16 (“Governance . . . must be well connected with the Nation’s scientific
research base to effect meaningful advances in forensic science practices.”).
282
See Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 744.
283
Id. at 747.
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role in evidence analysis.284 Analysis in disciplines such as fingerprints,
toolmarks, and ballistics often comes down to a scientist’s experience and
“eye” for the evidence. Very little research has been directed towards
scientist biases in this process and how the scientist’s role as a possibly
partial observer can be limited.285 Some scholars suggest moving away
from the “eyeballing” method altogether by ensuring that an emphasis on
empirical data drives the reform of these fields.286
4. Adopting Standards and Forensic Frameworks
The lack of standards has far-reaching effects. The NAS Report noted
that forensic science training programs have no uniform standards, leading
to uncertainty in both the quality and relevance of the programs.287
Moreover, without first establishing a cohesive relationship between
forensic research and forensic practice, the system will continue to produce
preventable errors, employ outdated procedures and methodologies, and
struggle with internal disputes as to where the line between acceptable and
unacceptable procedures is to be drawn. As a result, until standards are
established, there can be no consistent method for granting crime lab
accreditation.288
The forensic sciences should look to the medical community and
university research hospitals as a model. By way of example, consider a
cancer researcher working side-by-side with an oncologist. The oncologist
practices medicine and the researcher documents, analyzes, and works on
ways to improve treatments. The research is then shared across hospitals
and universities and published in medical journals. The entire medical
community then advances by better understanding the disease and,
accordingly, adjusting the standards for treatment.
A similar partnership would be a perfect fit for forensic science and
would meet key benchmarks for setting research standards under the
Standards Act. First, it would establish standards for measurements,
analysis, and interpretation.289 This standardization would ensure that labs
are uniform in their determination of what results mean. Second, it creates
284
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (“A body of research is required to establish the
limits and measures of performance and to address the impact of sources of variability and
potential bias.”).
285
See id.
286
See generally Mnookin et al., supra note 54.
287
See id. at 237.
288
See id. at 25 (“Standards should reflect best practices and serve as accreditation tools
for laboratories and as guides for the education, training, and certification of professionals.”).
289
See Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, H.R. 3064, 113th Cong.
§ 7(a)(1)(B)(i) (2013).
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standardization in the products and services forensic scientists supply to the
criminal justice system.290 Such standardization would address the
disparities that arise when labs on the whole employ different
methodologies, vary in their protocols, or maintain dissimilar reporting
requirements.291 By addressing those disparities, the forensic science
community would have a clear foundation—one recognized at the macro
level—for establishing standards for crime lab accreditation. Finally, the
resulting standards would accomplish the same objectives in the forensic
science community that standards have accomplished in the medical
community: quality assurance, ethics policing, reducing errors, and
inspiring faith from the community it serves.
I should underscore that researching and developing standards cannot
occur overnight. Relationships between crime labs and universities would
take time to establish, and agreeing on a specific research agenda is no easy
task. There would be setbacks, frustrations, and unforeseen issues that
develop. Moreover, research, standards and empirical studies for specific
forensic sciences would not be a one-size-fits-all fix to forensic sciences
generally. The frameworks of each individual discipline require different
methodologies and, indeed, different approaches to conducting research.
The NAS Report’s indictment created an “us vs. them” mentality that still
lingers. But the notion that “we’re in this together” is what forensic science
needs. Understanding the limitations and longevity of the research
partnerships is critical to their success.
5. Standardizing Terminology and Reporting
Forensic sciences have very few, if any, national standards for
terminology and reporting.292 Terminology plays a significant role in many
court settings. A jury can hear that two samples are a “match,” are
“consistent with,” are “identical,” are a “likely” match, or are of many other
kinds of relation to each other, and the jury can take all these relations to
mean the same thing, even when they do not.293 Worse, without a standard
language for reporting results, the meanings of the relationship titles can

290

See id. § 7(a)(1)(B)(ii).
The NAS Report notes that underfunded crime labs are in dire need of up-to-date
equipment. See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, 59. Such inconsistencies in funding
necessarily lead to inconsistencies in results. Further, insufficient equipment maintenance is
also a common problem facing labs. See id. at 59–60. Even the FBI lab, which holds itself
out as using “cutting-edge science,” reported a need for additional equipment. See id. at 66;
Using Cutting-Edge Science to Solve Cases and Prevent Acts of Crime and Terror, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/U79DOF (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
292
See NAS Report, supra note 1, at 21.
293
See id.
291
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vary from scientist to scientist, depending on what standards, if any, the
scientist operates under. A “negative” fingerprint analysis, for example,
could mean that it was “excluded,” “inconclusive,” “unable to locate,” or a
poor sample, depending on the agency or individual conducting the
analysis294—all of which are likely indistinguishable to the average
layperson juror.
Reporting standards also differ between labs.295 While some reports
include detailed accounts of the tests and protocols performed, others
contain barely more than the scientist’s brief conclusory statements
regarding the test results (which, as stated, could have many different
meanings).296 Further, reports can differ widely, including what, if any,
error rates they list and whether and to what extent the reports list the tests
performed and protocols followed.297 The decision to provide a court with a
conclusory report, as opposed to a detailed report, falls to the lawyer and
her client. To ensure transparency in different scientists’ comparison of
evidence, they should clearly define what they observe and interpret it as
“consistent” or “in disagreement.” They should also document and be able
to explain re-analyses of what they originally observe and, if they have
reviewed other evidence in the cases, acknowledge the potential impact of
their biases. Without documenting changes in subsequent analyses,
additional analyses misplace what the examiners originally observed and
interpreted versus what they might now believe after comparing it with the
record.
A forensic research partnership could pioneer standardized
terminology and reports. Such standardization would allow juries to hear
consistent, reliable, and clear testimony with respect to forensic evidence.
It would also prevent forensic witnesses from obfuscating results through
exaggerated reporting methods.
As a baseline, the International
Organization for Standardization has already promulgated some
international guidelines for general competence requirements to carry out
certain tests or calibrations, which include standards for data reporting.298
While adopting these international guidelines throughout the United States
would not necessarily solve all terminology and reporting issues, it would,
at the very least, provide some reference points for uniform vocabulary and
reporting protocols.

294

See id. at 141.
See id. at 21 (“Some forensic science laboratory reports meet [a high] standard of
reporting, but many do not.”).
296
See id.
297
Cf. id.
298
Id. at 21, 113–14.
295
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B. DRILLING DOWN ON THE DETAILS: LONGER-TERM GOALS

While the primary efforts of research partnerships—such as directed
research and standardizing terminology—are broad, big picture
accomplishments, there are other (I hesitate to say “secondary”)
significantly needed benefits that would take some time to realize.
1. Certifying Practitioners and Labs
The lack of certification programs for both practitioners and labs
engenders inconsistencies. Currently, lab accreditation is only required in a
handful of states,299 and judges and juries are often unfamiliar with the
certification processes used by different organizations. In Texas, for
example, forensic labs must meet statutory accreditation requirements for
forensic evidence to be admissible.300 Still, a roof leak in a Houston DNA
lab went unchecked for years, contaminating evidence maintained in a
storage facility and rendering it unusable.301
The absence of required certifications for practitioners is problematic
as well. Very few states have any sort of mandatory accreditation or
accountability programs for their scientists.302
ASCLD/LAB offers
accreditation that aligns with the international guidelines described
above,303 but in most jurisdictions accreditation is not mandatory.304
According to ASCLD/LAB, the United States has 383 crime labs accredited
in its program.305 Even in disciplines where some organizations do offer
certifications, many extremely experienced practitioners choose not to even

299

Although accreditation is not mandatory, “[o]ther states with various types of forensic
[oversight] boards include: Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island and Washington.” TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM’N, JUSTICE THROUGH
SCIENCE (2011), available at http://goo.gl/2y9v0L; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful
Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163,
170 (2007) (“The scandals have prompted Texas and Oklahoma to require their crime
laboratories to be accredited, joining New York, which has mandated accreditation since
1994.” (citations omitted)).
300
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (West Supp. 2013). Labs are not,
however, required to be accredited to admit into evidence latent print examinations and
various other forms of forensic analysis. Id. art. 38.35(a)(4).
301
See Giannelli, supra note 299, at 190–91 (citation omitted).
302
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
303
Quality Policy, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS./LAB. ACCREDITATION BD.,
http://goo.gl/WUFaIE (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
304
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 199–200.
305
As of November 21, 2013, out of the 402 accredited labs, 194 are state labs, 132 are
local agency labs, 31 are federal labs, 19 are international labs, and 26 are private labs.
Accredited Laboratory Index, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. / LAB. ACCREDITATION BD.,
http://goo.gl/tyeZXK (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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pursue the certifications.306 Without any requirement that forensic evidence
witnesses hold certifications, there is little reason for many practitioners to
pursue them. This undercuts the validity of such certifications for those that
do choose to pursue them.
Moreover, the lack of certification programs results in practitioners
with disparate proficiencies. In 1978, the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) sponsored a lab proficiency testing program, and
more than 200 crime labs throughout the country participated.307 The
program showed a wide range of proficiency levels.308 Labs operating at
lower proficiency levels failed most often in interpreting test results because
of careless error, lack of experience, utilizing improper methodology,
standard contamination or mislabeling, and inadequate databases or
standard spectra.309 Another entity that conducted further testing from 1978
to 1991 found similar results.310 Despite these glaring errors dating back to
1978, there has been no comprehensive reform.311
A national forensic science standards entity could provide for
certifications for both labs and practitioners. Providing one national
certification program would ensure baseline standards for all labs and
enhance predictability in courtrooms. Further, the entity could create
certification systems for specific forensic science disciplines. Such
certification requirements could provide for a base level of education,
experience, and expertise, making the voir dire stage of tendering a witness
as an expert much simpler and the results much more reliable. Requiring
certain educational steps before one is able to practice in the forensic
sciences would encourage universities to create forensic science courses.
This increased demand would also help encourage forensic science research
and promote education programs to broadly disseminate results.312

306
See, e.g., Diane L. France, Forensic Anthropology: A Brief Review, CENGAGE
LEARNING, http://goo.gl/KUB5s3 (last Apr. 14, 2014) (“Presently, not all individuals who
identify themselves as forensic anthropological experts are board certified; although almost
all have at least a master’s degree and several years of experience.”).
307
See Giannelli, supra note 299, at 213.
308
See id. at 213–14 (“Seventy-one percent of the crime laboratories tested provided
unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5%
erred in a soil examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 214 (noting that “[a] wide range of proficiency levels among the nation’s
laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the
laboratories” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
309
See id. at 214.
310
See id. at 215.
311
See id. at 214.
312
See Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2012, H.R. 6106, 112th Cong.
§ 5(d)(1)(D) (2012).
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2. Codes of Ethics
Forensic scientists frequently encounter ethical issues because they
may be paid by the government but offer their services in criminal trials to
both the government and the defense. Practitioners also need to be able to
operate in situations where there will be little, if any, oversight and where
biases might be significant motivators. To address these concerns, several
forensic science organizations have adopted codes of ethics,313 but
currently, “there are no consistent mechanisms for enforcing any of the
existing codes of ethics.”314 A federal entity could mandate such a code of
ethics and allow for the slight variations different forensic disciplines may
require. Further, tying this code of ethics to certifications in the various
disciplines would help effect wider adoption.
3. Coordinating National Databases
Forensic science in a criminal case usually involves matching some
type of unknown sample to one or more known samples with the goal of
producing a match or exclusion.315 The probability of matching an
unknown sample to a known person or thing increases with the amount of
known samples available to search against. More far-reaching databases of
forensic samples would provide scientists with increased amounts of known
samples. Some forensic science disciplines have already started national
databases, such as the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). 316
The FBI also manages a database, which includes fingerprints, criminal
histories, mug shots, and other information associated with individuals.317
Another example is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives’ database for ballistic imaging.318
But the mere existence of these databases is not enough. Even CODIS
currently suffers from fragmentation and backlogs. DNA evidence is
submitted into CODIS, which itself is made up of three different groups for

313

See, e.g., American Academy of Forensic Sciences Bylaws, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC
SCIS., http://goo.gl/6lMgGx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
314
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
315
See Allan Sincox & Marijane Hemza-Placek, Challenging the Admissibility of DNA
Testing, 83 ILL. B.J. 170, 171 (1995) (outlining the steps of DNA testing typically used by
police agencies, called Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism testing).
316
See Laboratory Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/XlzG6D (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
317
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/B5nvNW (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
318
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO &
FIREARMS, http://goo.gl/V82d2J (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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the local, state, and national data.319 One FBI report revealed that the
average time it takes for the FBI to provide DNA results is approximately
150 to 600 days.320 Related to this steep turnaround time is the backlog of
samples. In 2009, the United States had a backlog of 300,000 DNA
samples.321 And despite its wealth of data, the FBI’s fingerprint database
still poses problems for forensic scientists. The database’s equipment
vendors do not follow the same standards for importing data; law
enforcement agencies and labs do not always have the resources to interact
with it, and jurisdictional disagreements and differences in policies prevent
agencies from sharing fingerprint data more broadly.322
For the forensic sciences that already have national databases, a federal
entity could mandate the use of such databases and dictate the way local
agencies interact with them. This would prevent many of the access and
sharing problems law enforcement agencies currently experience. For
forensic disciplines that do not have significant national databases, a federal
entity could pattern new databases from the successes seen with other
databases. This would allow a central authority to apply best practices in
database management from one discipline to another.
4. Independence of Forensic Labs
Forensic labs currently maintain a cozy relationship with law
enforcement and prosecution offices, both financially and geographically.
In fact, a survey found that approximately 79% of 300 forensic labs studied
were located within law enforcement or public safety agencies, and 57%
worked exclusively with evidence submitted by law enforcement.323
In addition, there is a wide disparity in the resources available to
defense counsel compared with prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies.324 Prosecutors often have cost-free access to their local or branch
crime labs.325 And while indigent defendants secured the due process right

319
See JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING, TOWARD A
COMPARISON OF DNA PROFILING AND DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 4 (2010).
320
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LABORATORY’S FORENSIC DNA CASE BACKLOG 6 (2010),
available at http://goo.gl/7Zk9Bk.
321
Id.at 2.
322
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
323
Paul C. Giannelli, Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of Motivational
and Cognitive Bias, 2 UTAH L. REV. 247, 250 (2010).
324
See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 75–76.
325
See id.
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to expert defense witnesses in Ake v. Oklahoma,326 they often do not have
reciprocal rights of access or the means to afford private defense experts.327
5. Developing Education Programs
The NAS Report criticized forensic sciences for the absence of
doctoral programs in forensic science and the dearth in quality and funding
of forensic science education programs generally.328 While each university
will have to specifically address how forensic science fits into its
curriculum, a collaborative effort with crime labs to promote Bachelor of
Science degrees (as opposed to a Bachelor of Arts in Forensic Science
found at some schools) will improve forensic science education. These
degrees may supplant the “apprenticeship” system found in some forensic
disciplines, but the training component can be fine-tuned and bolstered in
the confines of a formal university program. These education programs
could serve to benefit not only the practitioners themselves, but also
lawyers and judges.329
V. BUILDING ON EXISTING MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS TO IMPROVE
QUALITY AND COST
The NAS Report’s cardinal recommendation was the creation of a
single forensic science entity to promote an “aggressive, long-term agenda
to help strengthen the forensic science disciplines.”330 The NAS Report
envisioned a national entity that would be responsible for overseeing
research and determining standards.331 This broad undertaking was
immediately met with skepticism and resistance.332 I would like to keep the
NAS’s “aggressive long-term agenda[,]” but replace the goal of creating a
single, national entity with that of creating a number of smaller research
partnerships that share their work with a larger clearinghouse (perhaps the
new National Commission on Forensic Science) that tracks the universe of
research being conducted. Of course, any reform has drawbacks, and the
research partnership is not immune to downsides. Nonetheless, the past
326

See 470 U.S. 68, 83–84 (1985).
See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 75–76.
328
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 223–24. Currently, there is no doctoral program
specifically in forensic science. See id.
329
See NAS Report, supra note 1, at 234.
330
Id. at 16.
331
See id. at 189–90.
332
See supra text accompanying notes 259–63. It seems much of the backlash
concerned the NAS Report’s recommendation that the national entity would be divorced
from law enforcement. See, e.g., Joseph Polski, Forensic Science: A Critical Concern for
Police Chiefs, 9 POLICE CHIEF 24–25 (2009).
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five years of debate have shown that everyone has an opinion. Even though
we have struggled to execute those opinions, we can look to some of the
current frameworks that are attempting to embrace forensic reform for
guidance.
A. INCUBATING FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: IDEAS AT HOME AND
ABROAD

U.S. forensic science represents a patchwork quilt of standards and
policies. Because thousands of jurisdictions have their own operating
procedures, consistency and predictability are elusive. It seems that a
logical starting point would be to consider pooling and sharing forensic
resources across state and even international borders.333 Indeed, the
European Union has embraced the notion that “forensic cooperation does
not stop at Europe’s borders but needs to be seen in the context of
international forensic cooperation around the world.”334 Moreover, the
United Kingdom—which has been on the forefront of forensic development
for decades—has made significant inroads in forensic reform by using a
grassroots approach rather than a top-down legislative thrust upon reluctant
labs.
The harsh truth is that the United States does not have the budget
needed to legislate a comprehensive federal forensic science agenda. Yet,
forensic sciences cannot afford an ad hoc fix or wait for the system to selfcorrect on the back-end in the postconviction setting. Allowing innocent
people to languish in prison until the criminal justice system finds the time
and opportunity to remedy its errors arguably amounts to a human rights
catastrophe. That should not be the system we settle for. Forensic science,
thus, needs coordination and creative resourcing through research
partnerships that will grow the roots for reform.
This Part begins by outlining two U.S. examples of reform, both of
which are in early stages. Next, it describes forensic reform progress in the
United Kingdom and the European Union to draw lessons that can enhance
a U.S. research partnership model.

333
See Pawel Rybicki, Standardization in the Area of Scientific Evidence in European
Union, in POLICING IN EUROPE, 16 J. POLICE STUD. 91, 92–94 (2010). Moreover, the
ancillary benefit to this construct is that, with crime becoming increasingly global, having
unified forensics in place makes good investigative sense as well. See id. at 93.
334
RICHARD GILL, FORENSIC SCI. SERV., STUDY ON OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION AND
INFORMATION-SHARING AMONG FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORIES AND OTHER RELEVANT
BODIES OF DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES AND BETWEEN THESE AND COUNTERPARTS IN THIRD
COUNTRIES 6 (2008), available at http://goo.gl/t45ui6.
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1. Test-Tube Babies: Two U.S. Examples
Two U.S. labs have committed to forensic science research while also
performing casework. Both labs—one a local initiative and the other a
product of the Department of Defense (DoD)—solve problems the NAS
Report addressed. The labs’ structures and operational frameworks provide
a network of oversight, maximize efficiency and analytical quality, and
focus on collaboration and uniformity to establish forensic standards in both
research and casework.
a. The Washington, D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences
On October 1, 2012, the District of Columbia’s newly built
Consolidated Forensics Laboratory and its newly created Department of
Forensic Sciences335 (DFS) opened for business.336 The lab houses a public
health lab, the medical examiner’s office, and a hybrid of the police
forensics lab and the new DFS crime lab.337 Eventually, the police crimescene unit will be phased out, and the all-civilian DFS crime lab, along with
the health lab, will be under DFS’s jurisdiction.338
The primary motivation for creating DFS and building the crime lab
was the NAS Report.339 DFS and the crime lab are the District of
Columbia’s response to the Report’s call for a unified, independent agency
that would promulgate, implement, and oversee robust standards and
practices for the forensic sciences, albeit on a more local level than the
Report had in mind. A secondary, but more public, motivating factor was
the recent front-page news coverage highlighting forensic labs’ substandard
practices and the lack of effective oversight.340 With DFS, the District
aimed to achieve independence—not only from conducting forensic
analysis in borrowed space or contracting analyses with labs outside the

335

Establishment of the Department of Forensic Sciences, D.C. CODE § 5-1501.02 (2011).
Andrea Noble, Forensics Laboratory Opens in D.C., WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at
A15; Zoe Tillman, D.C. Crime Lab Chief Outlines Strategy for Preventing Scandals, BLOG
OF LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:52 PM), http://goo.gl/zXXMfP.
337
See Sam Pearson, District Moves Away from Police Control of Forensic Functions,
HOMICIDE WATCH D.C. (Jan. 2, 2013 9:00 AM), http://goo.gl/IwzMox.
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See id.; see also Tillman, supra note 336.
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See Pearson, supra note 337; cf. Tillman, supra note 336; Zoe Tillman, In Q&A, D.C.
Forensic Sciences Chief Says Lab Moving Toward Accreditation, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan.
28, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://goo.gl/I4cMOX. Specifically, the District of Columbia endeavored
to respond to how the Report identified crippling fragmentation as the most significant threat to
forensic science quality and credibility. In particular, the District of Columbia aimed to resolve
the documented lack of uniform standards, training, and accreditation, as well as effective
oversight of forensic science practices. See Tillman, supra note 336.
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See, e.g., Peters, supra note 129.
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area,341 but also independence from law enforcement and political pressure,
as recommended by the NAS Report.342 DFS hopes to accomplish this by
both having its own building and phasing law enforcement personnel out of
its operations.
Another goal for DFS is to encourage and maintain efficiency. Having
a single department overseeing the efforts of several groups in the same
physical area provides central oversight, uniform standards of operation,
and a manageable system of checks and balances.343 By housing several
interactive departments under one roof, DFS hopes to encourage
communication and collaboration among units, thereby increasing its
overall efficiency and preventing backlogs. With a single department at the
administrative helm, and a common intent to promote and maintain high
standards, those standards would more likely be followed, and procedural
missteps would be discovered before things get out of hand.
b. The Department of Defense Forensic Enterprise Directive
DoD has also made operational quality at its forensic labs a priority. A
recent DoD directive establishes policies for military forensic work and
delegates responsibilities for different forensic tasks and areas among
groups within DoD.344
The directive seeks to establish increased collaboration and
communication among various DoD divisions in an effort to “develop and
maintain an enduring, holistic, global forensic capability to support the full
range of military operations.”345 The directive sets up a central committee
to coordinate all forensic enterprise activities. Responsibilities for
promulgating standards and monitoring implementation and practices are
delegated to different groups within the DoD.346
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See Noble, supra note 336.
See Pearson, supra note 337. DFS Director Max Houck admitted that understanding
and maintaining his lab’s independence from law enforcement will be among its more
difficult tasks. See Tillman, supra note 339. Yet, he is hopeful that its independence from
both law enforcement and political pressure will allow DFS to focus more intently on
grounding its results upon good science, highly trained (civilian) personnel, and continuing
education for analysts. See id.; see also Tillman, supra note 336.
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See Pearson, supra note 337; Tillman, supra note 339.
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See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. No. 5205.15E, DOD FORENSIC ENTERPRISE § 1(a)
(Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 5205.15E].
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See id.
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See id. For instance, the act places certain forensic disciplines like DNA, trace, and
latent prints in the hands of the Secretary of the Army, while other forensic disciplines—
image and video analysis, for example—are housed under the Secretary of the Air Force.
See id. 5205.15E § 1(d)-(e).
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The goals outlined in the directive seem to mirror those DFS sought in
terms of collaboration, uniformity, and quality. All appear intent on
establishing a central oversight entity over different groups performing
different forensic discipline functions and on promoting collaboration
among the groups. The DoD directive sets up a uniform system of
standards and procedures to guide forensic activity.347
The directive further establishes a rather complex web of directors and
advisors to establish policy and monitor performance with respect to
different forensic disciplines, in keeping with standards and procedures
established by the central committee.348 Much like DFS, the purpose here is
likely to maximize efficiency and analysis quality while minimizing error.
And as with DFS, the difficulty likely will be to strike a balance between
providing both local oversight and forensic practice monitoring and global
oversight of the collaboration and communication among a number of
interdependent groups.
2. Across the Pond: Lessons from the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has arguably been on the forefront of forensic
science for decades. From its crime scene investigation in the Jack the
Ripper case, to its embrace of DNA fingerprinting, to the demise of the
iconic Forensic Science Services (FSS), the United Kingdom has
experienced a roller coaster in forensic science administration.
Understanding the United Kingdom’s success requires a review of its
previous failed attempts to increase quality.
a. First Steps: The Forensic Science Service
FSS was once a dominant forensic force in the United Kingdom.349 At
one time, FSS operated a monopoly of the United Kingdom’s forensic
science workload.350 In 1991, however, FSS became an executive agency,
which ran more like a business and, for the first time, charged for its
services.351 As a government-owned company, FSS sold its services to
police forces and in December 2010, held 60% of the forensic science
market share.352 In 1995, FSS created the first DNA database.353 Each
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year, FSS works on more than 120,000 cases, employing over 1,000
scientists.354
Still, the United Kingdom is not without its stories of wrongful
conviction. In 1974, a pub bombing left 21 people dead and 160 injured.355
On the night of the bombings, six Irishmen were arrested, and in 1975, the
men were convicted based on confessions, evidence linking the men to the
Irish Republican Army, and forensics suggesting the men handled
explosives.356 They were beaten and even tortured, but with a series of
opportunities to rectify the situation, the courts balked and left the men both
legally and physically defenseless.357 Their first appeal was denied, their
civil action against police for assault was dismissed, and a referral by the
Home Secretary to review the case in 1987 was largely ignored.358
With controversy building each day the men sat in jail, a new Home
Secretary referred the case to an appeals court yet again, this time with
support from the director of public prosecutions, who decided he would not
fight for the convictions to stand.359 The court determined that the two
issues addressed—the voluntariness of the confessions and sufficiency of
forensic evidence—both signaled that the convictions were
unsupportable.360 The forensic tests were originally held to confirm that
two of the six men handled explosives; however, scientists later admitted
that “a range of innocent products” could produce the same positive
results.361 This “miscarriage of justice” came to an end in 1991, when the
six men were finally freed sixteen years after their convictions.362 Their
release proved to be a watershed moment for U.K. forensic science.
The day after the “Birmingham Six” were released, the government
called for a royal commission to report on forensic science issues.363
Amidst sweeping calls for changes, there were virtually no major
353
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recommendations in the 1993 report, aside from suggesting an advisory
council to oversee the use of forensics.364 A few years later, FSS put its
own group together to address quality standards.365 FSS was already well
on its way to a quality framework based on ISO 17025, an international
accreditation standard, but aimed for a broader-reaching approach.366
b. Learning to Walk: The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) offers an
international standard for lab quality.367 ISO 17025 applies to testing and
calibration labs, and ISO suggests that accreditation organizations use its
standards to measure quality through both managerial and technical
requirements.368 The management requirements focus on policy-oriented
changes within labs to ensure quality, including policies, standards, and
procedures.369 The technical requirements emphasize scientist competence,
environmental conditions, methodology, reporting requirements, and
equipment management.370
In an effort to increase quality, the government in 1999 focused on
registering practitioners with a voluntary program for assessing forensic
science competence.371
The standards required an assessment of
competence and reassessment every four years.372 While the voluntary
program began as a government-funded enterprise, the ultimate goal was to
reach 10,000 registered practitioners and become self-financing, but by
2004, it had only 1,800 members.373 With less-than-successful enrollment,
a prominent police association withdrew its support, and government
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funding was transferred to the National Policing Improvement Agency. 374
Realizing that focusing on individual practitioners failed to regulate quality
at the organizational level, the National Policing Improvement Agency
decided to remove all aid.375
Over time, FSS experienced severe financial troubles, which some
attributed to the large number of forensic services it provided, as opposed to
private labs that provided only the most lucrative services.376 In an attempt
to rectify the situation, FSS was granted trading fund status in 1999 to
increase the organization’s financial flexibility.377 Six years later, FSS was
established as a govco, a “[g]overnment-owned, contractor-operated”
organization.378 The government intended to create a kind of public sector–
private market partnership that would provide the efficiency of the private
market with the ability to control quality and standards. As a result, many
other companies entered the market, driving competition up and costs
down.379 After reportedly losing about two million pounds a month, the
government decided to shut down FSS in favor of an entirely private
market.380 As the organization that employed 1,600 prepared to close, the
decision caused public backlash, with some accusing the government of
allowing cost to determine justice.381
c. Running Forward: Privatization and Regulation
As the private market increased its activities, and concerns that the
government was favoring cost over quality endured, the government
stepped in and created the forensic science regulator, a publicly funded
position not directly controlled by the government.382 The regulator
explained what he called the “most obvious risk” in closing FSS: going
from very stringent accreditation requirements to a nonaccredited
environment.383 A condition required to close FSS alleviated this concern:
only ISO 17025-accredited labs could receive FSS work.384 Additionally,
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all DNA labs reporting to the police had to comply with ISO 17025
standards, and all fingerprint labs had to comply by 2015.385
In March 2012, “the government closed the FSS from taking on more
material”386 and achieved its goals of increasing both efficiency and quality
through regulation and privatization.387 DNA profiles are reported within a
few days of when the lab receives the materials.388 Making the turnaround
even more impressive, profiling is available for all crime types, rather than
just serious crimes: in the United Kingdom, anyone arrested can be required
to give DNA for profiling purposes.389 Although the United Kingdom has
significantly fewer cases, lower crime, and a lower population than the
United States, the comparison between the two countries’ DNA systems is
staggering.390 While it is possible the United Kingdom’s lack of backlog
and quick turnaround stem from its demographic differences, the more
likely answer is that the United Kingdom has succeeded at effectively
managing its DNA system. Within two years of setting up its DNA
database, the United Kingdom saw backlogs rise into the six-figures.391
But, just two decades later, the United Kingdom has no backlog for its
DNA analysis—a foreign concept in the United States.392
In addition to requiring accreditation to address quality issues, the
United Kingdom mandated standards for processing crime scenes,
transporting samples to labs, and now requires different labs to analyze
samples from the accused and the victims.393 Additionally, all data is
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submitted to an accreditation service to ensure standards are met, and the
regulator may, at any time, enter a lab to check compliance.394
3. Wishful Thinking: The European Union
It is useful to contrast the United Kingdom’s “deregulation” of
forensic science with the attempt at centralization in continental Europe.
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) aims to be
recognized as Europe’s leading authority on forensic science.395 ENFSI
endeavors to maintain the quality of forensic science and develop forensic
services delivery throughout the European Union. ENFSI itself is a
network of forensic institutes and labs geographically spread across Europe,
including those from E.U. member states and most E.U. candidate
countries. As of 2012, ENFSI membership consisted of sixty-four institutes
spread across thirty-six countries.396
ENFSI recognizes that the lack of common standards is a barrier to
cooperation between forensic science labs. Further, the benefits of common
standards in the fight against crime have been a priority for ENFSI for some
time.397 In its policy statement on accredition, ENFSI makes the call to
harmonize forensic standards and procedures.398 It states that “ENFSI
wishes to promote consistent and reliable scientific evidence through the
whole forensic process from the scene of [the] crime to court.”399
It is obvious—at least from the European Union’s point of view—that
common standards are essential to effectively investigating crimes that
involve forensic information that spans across national borders. For
example, the Prüm Treaty (legislation before the European Union) relies on
member states to make forensic information (DNA and fingerprints)
contained in national databases available for searching.400 To facilitate this
process, the data must be in a standard format so that such searches are
technically feasible.
Yet, with all of its centralization, the European Union itself lacks the
standards in forensic science that it wants. There is no institutional control,
394
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and thus “no institution which develops forensic science standards, or
enforces and supervises their implementation.”401 Indeed, while Europe’s
crime labs acknowledge that the creation of an independent forensic
institute is just a matter of time, that time may be well off in the future.
The same might hold true for the United States. Even with a tested
model from the United Kingdom and analogous U.S. examples, several
obstacles stand in the way of change that would revolutionize U.S. forensic
science industrywide: fragmentation, a lack of public interest, and drastic
demographic differences. Without addressing these issues preliminarily,
any attempts at reform would be terminal at worst and a prolonged illness at
best, just as the United Kingdom saw through its two-decades long
experiment. Research partnerships—akin to the U.K.’s grassroots forensic
overhaul—could be the drastic (and palatable) change needed.
B. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PROBABLY NOTHING IS PERFECT

While creating research partnerships is likely a far cry from a massive
federal level entity, a bottom-up approach will bridge the chasm between
forensic research and practice, while developing the infrastructure needed
for industrywide reform.
The drawback to a grassroots effort is, of course, its inherent ad hoc
nature that, without any additional controls, will simply be a redundancy of
the current system. As the NAS Report noted: “[I]t is not clear how these
associations interact or the extent to which they share requirements,
standards, or policies. Thus, there is a need for more consistent and
harmonized requirements.”402 In the research partnership model, this
question of interaction will be an issue. Research partnership agencies and
subagencies might not have adequate means of communication. A method
for communicating efforts to improve standardization with other researchers
and crime labs would be needed. The risk is that, with so many different
organizations all attempting to reform forensic science, there is bound to be
overlap and inefficiency.
To this end, establishing an advisory
committee,403 where membership represents a balanced cross-section of the
different disciplines and research labs, would go a long way toward
communicating concerns and implementing uniform standards among the
research partnerships.
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Nonetheless, the work will have to proceed in conversation with the
broader criminal justice system. Reforming forensic science in a vacuum—
even with the cooperation of crime labs—leaves out the end users of the
forensic product. Thus, research must be performed with attention to
courtroom admissibility and the realities of the criminal justice system.
Such an effort requires transparency in both evidence analysis and use (the
encompassing crime-to-conviction model), achieved only by clearly
documenting what information is observed and how it has been interpreted.
After observing the evidence, for example, it must then be translated into
value for a particular purpose (“suitability”). Defining what is suitable
evidence is a policy decision that may be static or plastic. Based on the
evidence observations, the analysis should articulate why, for example, a
print is or is not suitable for a specific purpose. Clearly defining
“suitability” should be considered not only for ensuring consistency
between examiners but also for identifying complex comparisons, which
may require additional measures of quality assurance to mitigate risks of
error. Forensic reform must also keep in mind the judges and juries who
will analyze and assess the information.
As Jane Moriarty posits, even when science is clearly inadequate,
judges have been unwilling to rigorously examine it because they are set in
their ways and “cannot seem to imagine” excluding evidence that
commonly comes in.404 In one case where defense counsel challenged his
client’s conviction based on the NAS Report’s condemnation of the
science’s validity, the judge reasoned that the NAS Report “merely presents
a general picture of the current processes and pitfalls of toolmark
identification and identifies possible methods of improvement.”405 Other
judges have likewise noted that the NAS Report’s recommendations are
important but still refuse to consider them.406
Any forensic science reform needs also to accept that courts are
particularly resistant to change. Because Daubert requires judges to act as
gatekeepers, admitting “good science” into their courtrooms and turning
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away everything else,407 forensic reform should encourage the
dissemination of forensic research in terms non-scientists can understand.408
Without an understanding of the faulty validity of many of the forensic
sciences, judges will continue to admit such evidence at trial.
The American criminal justice system is made up of counties, cities,
states, and the federal government. Despite being seriously underfunded,
understaffed, and undertrained in forensic science, state and local
organizations handle the vast majority of law enforcement activity.409
Alongside the lack of training and funding, the lack of unification among
the various systems results in fragmentation. If accreditation and
standardization criteria exist, they differ markedly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.410
In fact, most U.S. jurisdictions require no formal
certification for their forensic science practitioners.411 The structure of the
American government, with shared responsibility between the federal and
state governments, presents its own problems for reworking the system. As
the NAS Report noted, the federal government cannot unilaterally mandate
a new forensic program without infringing on authorities typically reserved
to the states.412 Instead, collaboration would be necessary. With a system
so divided, however, the idea of universally overhauling forensic science is
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enough to send any politician running. And if the workload does not do it,
the funding woes certainly would.
While news stories have extensively detailed faulty forensics leading
to innocent persons spending time in prison, their focus is on bad science
rather than ineffectual standards that fail to regulate a science that works
when it is conducted properly.413 Unless the public focus shifts from
blaming science to blaming policies, it is unlikely that Congress will make
any significant steps toward unifying the system. We need to invest in a
more efficient and quality friendly framework.
C. SETTING A STAGE FOR REFORM

Even with these obstacles, the United States could still achieve a
program comparable to that in the United Kingdom by utilizing existing
frameworks to create research partnerships.
The United Kingdom’s forensic science program, once a
predominantly public entity, thrived after the government released control
in favor of the competition and cost effectiveness that come with private
markets. Although many fought back, arguing that closing FSS favored
saving money at the expense of quality,414 data suggests that is not the case.
It is doubtful that research partnerships might ultimately privatize the U.S.
system of forensic science (or at least decouple crime labs from law
enforcement agencies). After all, the United Kingdom is far smaller, with
fewer jurisdictions and less crime. Moreover, similar privatization in the
U.S. prison system415 has been widely criticized.416 Finally, the U.K.
system could be characterized as capitalism all dressed up: it requires much
413
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more than a new dress and some shoes. To decrease costs while improving
quality standards, as the United Kingdom did, the traditional idea behind
capitalism—privatizing industry to increase competition—would probably
require significant government regulation.
In the realm of forensic science, there are only so many samples
available for labs to analyze. Taking steps toward establishing a privatized
(and thus, competitive) forensics industry—coupled with quality regulation
and government funding—would promote the use of cost-efficient
procedures that produce valid, reliable, and accurate results. In this respect,
decoupling crime labs from law enforcement agencies would add additional
layers of protection. As one former FBI assistant director explained,
investigations showed that labs controlled by law enforcement often
reported results biased in favor of the prosecution.417 Whether intentional
or not, the bias undermines the system’s credibility, calling into question
reliable techniques and reducing confidence in forensics as a whole.
Coupled with the decreased costs and increased efficiency that would
follow, a system of research partnerships sets the “path forward” that the
NAS Report called for back in 2009. While forensic science is not prepared
for its own version of an FDA, the use of something less drastic than a
federal watchdog is a good incentive to induce action. While the specter of
wrongful convictions should be (although I acknowledge it is not) a good
enough reason to consider a change in course, there are other incentives. If
forensic science as an industry would adopt a research partnership platform,
we could finally begin to set baseline requirements for standards and quality
while simultaneously increasing efficiency and decreasing costs.
CONCLUSION
Evidence admissibility is largely dependent on implementing and
enforcing comparable standards, which should be achieved for the entire
forensic process, from crime scene to courtroom. Yet, consistency and
predictability across the forensic nervous system are few and far between.
Ultimately, we can do better. Establishing a federal entity to oversee
reforms in forensic science attempts to accomplish too much in a sector that
remains fragmented and impervious to change. Research partnerships
between crime labs and universities, on the other hand, will improve lab
efficiency, foster communication between labs, and unify oversight.
Improving crime labs would directly correlate to keeping innocent
defendants out of jail, and in some cases, alive. Research partnerships
should prioritize the NAS Report recommendations to streamline, simplify,
417
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and accelerate forensic reform. Only when all crime labs speak the same
language, use the same methodologies and protocols, and embrace the
“science” component of their name will forensic science be better.
Reforming forensics is no small task. It will take cooperation from
scientists, lawyers, judges, and policymakers—but it can be done. Forensic
science should prevent wrongful convictions, not cause them. “There are
only two mistakes one can make on the road to truth: not going all the way,
and not starting.”418 This is our opportunity to set forensic science right
before it gets the result wrong and it stays that way.
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